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1 See generally Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the Democratization of
Dynasty, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 873 (1997) (discussing legal significance of donor intent).
2 Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing:  Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of Charitable
Fiduciaries?, 23 J. CORP. L. 655, 658 (1998).
I.  INTRODUCTION
A. OVERVIEW
For hundreds of years, scholars and practitioners have debated
the central position of donor intent in Anglo-American law—the
right of the “dead hand” to govern from the grave the use of a
charitable donation into the indefinite future, even into perpetuity.1
The topic of this Article is not, however, that normative position, but
rather the seemingly more mundane question of whether the donor
can enforce his or her intent in court.  As Professor Rob Atkinson
cautions:  “Standing questions are ‘who’ rather than ‘what’
questions. . . .  Technically speaking, [a denial of standing] is merely
a determination that the claim, however meritorious, should be
asserted by someone else.”2  Consider the following four scenarios:
CASE 1: D gives $100,000 to C University to establish a
fund to support library operations.
CASE 2: D gives $100,000 to C University to establish a
fund to support library operations.  C agrees
that D may bring suit to specifically enforce the
restricted gift.
CASE 3: D gives $100,000 to C University to establish a
fund to support library operations.  C agrees
that D and D’s descendants may bring suit to
specifically enforce the restricted gift.
CASE 4: D gives $100,000 to C University to establish a
fund to support library operations, but that if C
University does not carry out the purposes of
the gift, the gift shifts to H University.
This Article considers whether these four cases provide D with the
same rights to enforce the charity’s performance of the gift, and, if
not, whether they should be the same.  That is, does—and
2007] CHARITABLE-DONOR STANDING 1187
3 Laura B. Chisolm, Accountability of Nonprofit Organizations and Those Who Control
Them:  The Legal Framework, 6 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 141, 147 (1995).
4 Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 468 (Del. 1991) (addressing “vindicat[ion]” of charitable
beneficiaries’ rights).
should—drafting make a difference?  Does—and should—the law
care whether the donor has explicitly obtained the consent of the
charity to specific rights of private enforcement?  Moreover, does it
matter that there is another charity named as an alternative
beneficiary of the gift?  I supply suggested answers to these four
cases at the end of Part V of this Article.
Traditionally, private parties—including donors—have no legal
authority to sue to enforce charitable duties.  “[D]espite the fact that
the organization is legally bound by specific terms of the gift, legally
it is not the donor’s concern.  It is society’s concern, to be pursued (or
not) by society’s representative, the attorney general.”3  The reason
for disabling the donor might be to recognize the completeness of the
gift for public purposes.  The rule, however, applies even when the
donor is not seeking a return of the gift—indeed, a donor who has a
reversionary interest in the case of failure of the gift does have
standing to sue for its return.  In light of this focus on whether the
plaintiff has a direct interest in obtaining the property, in situations
where, as is most likely, the donor wants to make an irrevocable gift
to charity, a conditional gift in the form of a “gift over” to another
charity can be useful.  Thus, when a gift is made “to Charity X, but
if the terms of the gift are not carried out, then to Charity Y,” then
the alternative charity can sue to claim the gift.  In theory, this
direct oversight by the alternative beneficiary and prospect of losing
the property for noncompliance with the gift terms would
concentrate the mind of the initial donee—but so would granting
standing to the donor (when alive and available).  And donor
enforcement might be a better mechanism to carry out the donor’s
original charitable intent.
The traditional legal bar to donor standing forces the charitable
donor to make the case to the person traditionally granted standing
to sue:  the state attorney general.  Such a framework, though,
depends on “the inclination and budget of a public official” to enforce
charitable duties.4  If the donor cannot persuade the attorney
general to act, the donor must employ extra-legal avenues, such as
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5 For example, see Jack Siegel’s suggestions to a donor in the situation of the plaintiff
who was denied standing in Prentis Family Foundation v. Karmanos Cancer Institute, 698
N.W.2d 900 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), discussed in Part II.D.1.  See JACK B. SIEGEL, A DESKTOP
GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS, OFFICERS AND ADVISORS:  AVOIDING TROUBLE WHILE DOING
GOOD 444 (2006) (suggesting, “[i]n the case of building naming rights, filing an appropriate
deed that requires any building associated with the land to carry the specified name”). 
6 For supporters of expanded standing, see George Gleason Bogert, Proposed Legislation
Regarding State Supervision of Charities, 52 MICH. L. REV. 633, 633–36 (1954); Kenneth L.
Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar:  An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 433, 443–44 (1960) ; see also Henry Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law,
129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 609–10 (1981) (“[I]t makes sense to deny standing to [donors] only if
the consequence would be large numbers of spite suits, strike suits, or suits filed through sheer
idiocy . . . or of suits that, though based on a real grievance, are feebly litigated and thus do
more harm than good. . . .  [T]he real problem appears to lie in creating sufficient incentives
to lead individuals to bring suit rather than in creating roadblocks to hold them back.”).  But
see generally MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (2004)
[hereinafter FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING] (opposing expanded standing); Atkinson, supra note
2 (offering discussion by opponents of expanded standing); Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing
to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 37 (1993) (offering summary of cases and set
of recommendations); Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Enforceability and Sanctions, 1997 NAT'L
CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY & L. PROC.:  GOVERNANCE OF NONPROFIT ORGS.:  STANDARDS &
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.law.nyu.edu/ncpl/library/ publications/Conf1997_
FremontSmith_Final.pdf [hereinafter Fremont-Smith, Enforceability and Sanctions] (opposing
expanded standing).
bringing public pressure on the charity to change its behavior.  To
proponents of this system, this result is a good thing—it keeps the
law out of disputes best addressed by private parties, particularly
including the “market” for future donations.  After all, most charities
are in a repeat game, although often with different counter-parties,
and need to develop a reputation for honoring their promises.
Like other procedural “technicalities” that bar reaching the
merits, however, the traditional rule that a donor lacks standing to
complain in court about a charitable donee’s use of a restricted gift
can baffle and even infuriate.  This legal state of affairs leads donors
to adopt a range of self-help measures (one of which is the gift over
mentioned above).5  Anecdotally, donors’ increasing attempts to
influence charities’ use of donations have been taking the form of
“contracts” specifying charities’ performance obligations and donors’
enforcement rights.  While these detailed instruments have not yet
been tested in court, unhappiness with the relatively primitive
structure of current charity law is not limited to laymen.6  In a small
but growing recent trend, courts increasingly have been willing to
grant donors the right to bring suit for reversion when not explicitly
2007] CHARITABLE-DONOR STANDING 1189
7 See infra notes 162–70 and accompanying text.
8 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 710 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
specified in the gift instrument, as well as for specific
performance—with one claim for punitive damages scheduled to be
decided in 2007.7
If the trust law of settlor standing is unsatisfactory, the law
applicable to restricted gifts (not expressly made in trust) to
corporate charities does not even explicitly exist—and most
American charities take the corporate form.  Courts that sympathize
with donors in these situations have not been consistent in the legal
theory they apply, and they sometimes do not apply their chosen
legal theory accurately, mixing up the doctrines of charitable trusts,
conditional gifts, and contracts.  These decisions have repercussions
beyond the issue of standing, and spill over into the area of
permitted remedies.  One gets the sense that courts are groping
towards a result that allows the donor to enforce the terms of her
gift, but not too much (that is, not beyond the purposes of the gift),
and that limits the range of available contract remedies (that is, by
giving charities the “choice” of returning the gift or performing the
restriction).  These cases create additional mischief because courts
institutionally cannot address policy and design issues beyond those
raised by the case before them.  As Reporter of the American Law
Institute’s project on Principles of the Law of Nonprofit
Organizations, discussed in Part V of this Article, I hope to
rationalize the legal treatment of restricted charitable gifts.  Rather
than contort existing legal doctrines that were never designed to
answer these questions, courts would benefit from a positive law of
what I call in this Article “giftracts.”  However, legislatures, not
courts, could most thoroughly and fairly design a regime that
balances the competing policy concerns.
B. KEY LEGAL QUESTIONS
It is striking how many of the relevant judicial decisions (reported
as well as unreported) on standing have appeared in the last few
years.  Consider L.B. Research & Education Foundation v. UCLA
Foundation,8 a June 2005 California appellate court decision in a
1190 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1183
9 Id. at 712.
10 Id.
11 Id.
run-of-the-mill suit that ordinarily would have been dismissed (as,
indeed, it was by the trial court).9  The appellate opinion begins:
A donor contributed $1 million to establish an
endowed chair at the UCLA School of Medicine, which
UCLA accepted along with the conditions imposed by the
donor.  The primary question on this appeal is whether
the agreement created (1) a contract subject to a
condition subsequent or (2) a charitable trust, the
answer to which supposedly determines whether the
donor has standing to sue UCLA and the Regents of the
University of California to enforce the terms of the gift.
We find there is a contract subject to a condition
subsequent, not a charitable trust, and also find that, in
either event, the donor has standing to pursue this
action.  Because the trial court reached a contrary result,
we reverse.10
Several features make this decision a classic case for study.  The
remaining discussion in this Part uses those features as a guide to
this Article.
1. Does It Matter If Property Law or Contract Law Applies?  (See
Part II).  The court in L.B. Research & Education Foundation
suggests that the only analytical choice is between charitable trust
law and contract law.11  In so doing, the court makes two
fundamental mistakes.  First, the court views conditional gifts as
falling under contract law, when it is actually a specie of property
law.  Second, the court does not appreciate that restricted gifts to
corporate charities might fall outside the full panoply of trust law
without necessarily being classified as a conditional contract.  That
is, there are actually four ways to analyze a restricted gift—three
under property law (charitable trust, conditional gift, restricted gift
to corporate charity), and then contract law.  The choice of legal
2007] CHARITABLE-DONOR STANDING 1191
12 Traditionally, upon the failure of a charitable gift, the settlor or heirs could sue for the
gift even in the absence of an express reverter if the settlor lacked a “general charitable
intent.”  As described in Part III.B of this Article, modern trust doctrine has tried to minimize
this possibility.  As a result, it is more likely that the gift will be modified to a new charitable
purpose.  See infra notes 175–76 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 267–68 and
accompanying text (discussing interaction between cy pres and gift over).
13 L.B. Research & Educ. Found., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 714.
theory can determine not only the standing issue, but also the choice
of remedy.
Under the majority view of traditional trust doctrine, settlors
have no standing to specifically enforce a restriction.  Direct suits to
recover property are, by contrast, available because they protect
rights that are adverse to the interests of the trust.  Thus, a settlor
can sue to get the property back if the settlor has a reversionary
interest; if the initial gift fails and the settlor had provided for a “gift
over” to an alternative beneficiary, that beneficiary has a direct right
to sue to get the property.12  Ordinarily, trusts may be specifically
enforced only by co-trustees and beneficiaries.  For charitable trusts,
the attorney general, acting as parens patriae on behalf of indefinite
charitable beneficiaries, can sue to enforce the gift.  In addition,
however, those with a “special interest” have standing to bring an
enforcement action.  When they want to deny standing to donors,
courts traditionally apply analogous standing principles to restricted
gifts made (not in trust) to a corporate charity—and when they want
to grant standing, sometimes courts will apply these trust rules to
find that the donor has a special interest.  The recently promulgated
Uniform Trust Code explicitly grants standing to a settlor to enforce
the charitable trust.
In defining trusts, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts distinguishes
conditional gifts.  But conditional gifts, while excluded from trust
law, are still governed by property law, not contract law.
Importantly, a donor who has made a conditional gift (without more)
can sue to get the property back in the event the conditions are not
satisfied, but cannot sue for specific performance to compel the
donee to carry out the terms of the gift.  The L.B. Research &
Education Foundation case cited this narrow remedy as a reason
that courts prefer to construe restricted gifts as trusts rather than
conditional gifts.13  More worrisome is that the court declared that
while a charitable trust is enforceable at the instance of the attorney
1192 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1183
14 See id. at 714–15 (citing City of Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve, 82 Cal. Rptr.
2d 859 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)); see also infra notes 22–54 and accompanying text (discussing
standing under common law charitable trust doctrine).
general, a conditional gift to charity is not—that in the event of
breach, only the donor (or successors-in-interest) can sue, and only
for the return of the property.14
If contract law instead of property law were to apply to a
restricted or conditional gift, then the California appellate court
expresses a rather limited view of the range of possible remedies.
Contract law generally allows competent parties to agree to any
terms they negotiate.  But is such a laissez-faire view of private
ordering appropriate for charities?  What if the parties contract to
grant standing to the donor to enforce the restriction and not just to
sue for forfeiture?  Are there public policy limits that should be
invoked to protect charities from agreeing to waive the donor’s
traditional lack of standing?  Can (should) the law take the view that
the parties representing the charity have little incentive to act in the
charity’s best long-term interests, and thus lack the capacity to enter
into such a provision?  Moreover, “rewarding” parties who insert
specific terms in what are essentially gift instruments puts a
premium on drafting, and ratchets up the level of lawyering and
negotiating for too many major restricted gifts.
The most difficult obstacle for those who view restricted gifts as
contracts is the fact that many, if not most, restricted gifts are
created by testamentary disposition.  The recipient charity is not a
party to the will, although in some cases the charity was involved in
the planning of the restricted gift.  While the bare acceptance of the
gift could be viewed as acceptance of an offer to contract, ordinarily
there would have been no bargaining by the charity.  So would this
restricted gift be interpreted as a contract of adhesion?
Interestingly for proponents of a contract-law approach, courts
have not yet remarked on a striking asymmetry—courts typically do
apply contract analysis when it is the donor that has breached, by
failing to fulfill a charitable pledge.  So, is sauce for the goose sauce
for the gander?  Of course, a contract analysis does not necessarily
imply that the donor is a proper party to enforce the contract;
further difficulties would arise should such a case reach the merits.
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15 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS., pt. II, ch. 4, topic 3, introductory note
(Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005).  The Gifts chapter will be revised for Preliminary Draft No.
4, published sometime in May 2007.  Separately, the issues of standing and enforcement
(Chapter 7 of Preliminary Draft No. 3) will appear (as renumbered Chapter 6) in subsequently
published drafts; see also infra notes 253–60 and accompanying text.
16 L.B. Research & Educ. Found., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713.
As discussed in Part V of this Article, the ALI project is considering
whether to declare that a restricted charitable gift has contract-like
features—it is binding and enforceable—but enforceable only by the
attorney general (and not the donor), whereas a pledge also has
contract-like features—it is also binding and enforceable—but
enforceable not only by the attorney general but also by the charity.
Such an approach still leaves open the issue of remedy when the
charity breaches a restriction:  that is, return of property versus
specific enforcement (and even possibly damages).15
2. What Is the Relationship Between Donor Standing Here and
Donor Standing (Or Lack Thereof) in a Cy Pres Proceeding?  Can We
Meaningfully Distinguish Between a Suit to Enforce a Restriction
and a Suit over Charity Governance?  (See Part III).  The complaint
in L.B. Research & Education Foundation alleged:  
[T]he UCLA Foundation and the Regents had failed to
employ personnel meeting the criteria of the Chair;
failed to account to L.B. Research; offered the Chair to
nonqualified individuals and, over the objection of L.B.
Research and the Attorney General of the State of
California, elected an unqualified person to the Chair;
withdrew unearned fees from the Chair’s fund; and
refused to deliver the Chair’s fund to the Department of
Surgery at the University of California, San Francisco,
School of Medicine.16
These allegations clearly reveal a dispute over the UCLA
Foundation’s performance of a gift restriction that requires the
exercise of judgment.  Those who support donor standing to enforce
a gift restriction usually do not support donor standing to interfere
with charity governance.  But where is the line?
1194 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1183
17 Id. at 712.
What can look like a breach to the donor can, to the charity, be
the exercise of necessary discretion in implementing the restriction.
Moreover, whether it is the attorney general or a private party with
enforcement rights, everyone assumes that the proceeding must be
limited to addressing breach of the gift restriction.  Of course, in a
simple charitable trust—e.g., to fund scholarships—there is an
identity between the “gift” and the “charitable purpose.”  But in a
more complex charity, when does enforcing the gift unduly meddle
in the board’s duty of care?
In other situations, what can look like a breach to the donor can,
to the charity, be a situation requiring modification of the
restriction.  The settlor (or successor-in-interest) can sue to enforce
any reversionary interest, but the settlor as such traditionally does
not have a say in choosing the new purpose in a cy pres
proceeding—after all, if the trust purpose cannot now be carried out,
the settlor is in no better position to decide the fate of property given
away than any other member of the public.  The Uniform Trust
Code, however, grants the settlor standing to commence a cy pres
proceeding.
Finally, what is the relevance of a gift over to an alternative
beneficiary?  As indicated above, the gift instrument in L.B.
Research & Education Foundation provided that if UCLA does not
or cannot satisfy the agreement, the funds would be transferred, on
the same terms and conditions, to support an endowed chair in the
University of California at San Francisco’s School of Medicine.17  The
court does not address whether this gift over is actually made in
favor of the same legal donee as the initial gift (i.e., the University
of California system).  Let us assume that the San Francisco campus
is a separate legal entity.  What if UCLA does not perform because
it no longer teaches the medical speciality that is the subject of the
endowed chair?  Should the University of California at San
Francisco be able to sue for the gift over despite any ability of UCLA
to seek cy pres reform of the restriction?  What if instead UCLA can,
but does not, perform the restriction:  Does the existence of an
alternative beneficiary with rights to sue for the gift trump any
rights of the donor to complain about the donee’s breach?
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18 See id. at 717 (“The Attorney General may not be in a position to become aware of
wrongful conduct or to be sufficiently familiar with the situation to appreciate its impact, and
the various responsibilities of his office may also tend to make it burdensome for him to
institute legal actions except in situations of serious public detriment.” (quoting Holt v. Coll.
of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932, 935 (Cal. 1964))).
19 Id. at 713.
Separately, which parties may (or must) ratify a charity’s breach of
a gift restriction?
3. What Is the Significance of Attorney General Action, or
Inaction?  (See Part IV).  The few courts that do grant enforcement
rights to private parties usually cite the state attorney general’s
failure to act.  Indeed, the appellate court in L.B. Research &
Education Foundation quoted extensively from a California Supreme
Court opinion that had granted standing to co-trustees to enforce
fiduciary duties, in part in recognition of the institutional limits of
attorney general enforcement activities.18  In L.B. Research &
Education Foundation, however, the attorney general had taken
action:
In its first amended complaint, L.B. Research alleges
that it (through its own personnel and through the
Attorney General’s office) brought these alleged
violations to the attention of the appropriate people at
UCLA and demanded performance in accordance with
the terms of the gift, but that no response was
forthcoming.19
By contrast, the courts usually require more, and take pains to
identify the existence of improper attorney general behavior or of
disabling conflicts of interest.  On the other hand, courts that deny
standing to the plaintiff often emphasize that attorney general
inaction is not alone enough to empower a private party.
4. Can Courts Address the Problems in a Satisfactory Way, or Is
Legislation Needed?  (See Part V).  Finally, many proponents of
donor standing have in mind an individual donor, and are reluctant
to extend standing to the donor’s successors in interest (notably
children, or even further-removed descendants) or designees.  Note,
however, that the donor in L.B. Research & Education
1196 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1183
20 Id. at 712.
21 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005).
Foundation—like many major donors these days—is itself a
charitable institution having perpetual life.20  How should we
address the complication of a donor who never dies?
This difficulty is only one of several important line-drawing and
policy issues that cry out for a legislative rather than a judicial
solution, and one that is more nuanced than the Uniform Trust
Code’s simple grant of standing.  We are only asking for trouble if we
expect courts to choose among existing legal doctrines that were not
designed to address concerns unique to charitable corporations.  Yet
the extremes of either continuing the common law bar to donor
standing or adopting the Uniform Trust Code’s absolute grant is
guaranteed to produce the “wrong” result in at least some situations.
Those who favor expanding standing to donors must acknowledge
the weaknesses of legislative solutions so far adopted; those who
oppose expanding standing must acknowledge the apparent growing
number of sympathetic judges.
The ALI draft project, discussed herein, explores six issues with
respect to private enforcement of restrictions on charitable gifts:21
(1)How do we identity the permitted plaintiff:  the donor
only, and not descendants?  What about persons
designated in the gift instrument (assuming agreed to
by the charity)?
(2)What is the significance of the passage of time?
Imposing “term limits” on private enforcement (but
not attorney general enforcement) is particularly
significant for institutional donors and successor
enforcers designated in the gift instrument.
(3)How do we define a restricted gift?  For example,
what about an unrestricted gift made to a narrow-
purposed charity that now wants to expand or alter
its purpose (e.g., go coed)?
(4)Should the law require a minimum amount at issue to
prevent nuisance suits?
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(5)What remedies should we permit?  Can the donor sue
for damages?  Does the charity have the option to
“put” the gift back to the donor (with interest or other
adjustment?) and end the matter?
(6)More broadly, what is the significance of the
plaintiff’s identity as a donor?  Under trust law,
anyone with a “special interest” can sue to enforce the
gift; separately, under nonprofit corporate law, when
failure to follow the restrictions on a gift constitutes
breach of fiduciary duties, state law would
presumably permit any private party with standing to
bring a derivative suit to sue to enforce a gift.
II.  RESTRICTED CHARITABLE GIFTS:  PROPERTY, CONTRACT, OR
OTHER LAW?
A. STANDING UNDER COMMON LAW CHARITABLE TRUST DOCTRINE
The common law developed out of charitable trust law, where the
transferor is termed the settlor rather than the donor.  Potentially,
standing is permitted to three types of private parties:  (1) charitable
trust settlors and, more broadly, those with a “special interest”; (2)
donors of conditional gifts; and (3) co-trustees and “trust protectors”
(compare “visitors” under corporate law).  Separately, this
examination of trust law discusses statutory standing for
settlors—notably, in the Uniform Trust Code.
In brief, the attorney general, co-trustees, and persons with a
“special interest” have common law standing to bring suit to enforce
the terms of a charitable trust.  Traditionally, the settlor may sue
only if he or she had a reversionary interest, and thus has a claim
adverse to the interests of the charity.  This doctrine derives from a
view of the transaction as a property interest—and donated property
is simply no longer the settlor’s.  Rather, for enforcement trust law
looks forward:  beneficiaries (who have equitable title) have the
power to bring suit for breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the
trustee (who has legal title).  In the context of a charitable trust,
which ordinarily has no ascertainable beneficiaries, the state
attorney general represents the interests of those indefinite
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22 See Fremont-Smith, Enforceability and Sanctions, supra note 6, at 3 (adopting useful
term “sub-trustees” to refer to beneficiary organization entitled to income from donee fund).
23 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1957).
24 Id. cmts. b–c; see also 4A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS § 391 (4th ed. 1989) [hereinafter SCOTT ON TRUSTS] (“The question remains
whether the settlor or his heirs or personal representatives can maintain a suit for the
enforcement of charitable trust.  As we have seen, the settlor cannot revoke or modify a
charitable trust created by him unless he has reserved a power to do so.  After the trust is once
created, he has no beneficial interest in the property.  Accordingly, it has been held in a
number of cases that the settlor has no standing to maintain a suit for the enforcement of a
charitable trust.  There are, however, cases in which the opposite result has been reached.  But
where the settlor has a special interest in the performance of the trust he can maintain a suit
to enforce it.”); infra notes 171–80 and accompanying text (discussing when restriction is
instead modified); infra notes 253–60 and accompanying text (discussing effects of passage of
time).
25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. e (1957) (citing to cmt. f).
26 The Restatement (Third) of Trusts is being published in stages.  The material published
in 2003 contains, among other sections, definitions.  Comment i of section 5 (Trusts and Other
members of the public, and so can bring an enforcement action.
Rarely, courts will grant the charity’s beneficiaries standing as
persons with a special interest, generally only if those beneficiaries
are limited and ascertainable—for example, a trust for the benefit
of specified universities.22
1. Standing of the Settlor, in a Direct Suit or as One with a
Special Interest.  Section 391 (Who Can Enforce a Charitable Trust?)
of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts provides:
A suit can be maintained for the enforcement of a
charitable trust by the Attorney General or other public
officer, or by a co-trustee, or by a person who has a
special interest in the enforcement of the charitable
trust, but not by persons who have no special interest or
by the settlors or his heirs, personal representatives or
next of kin.23
Emphasizing this last point, the comments distinguish between a
suit to specifically enforce the terms of the trust and a suit to recover
the property:  neither the settlor nor his heirs or personal
representatives as such can maintain a suit for the enforcement of
a charitable trust.24  They can maintain a suit, however, on a claim
adverse to the trust.25  The standing rules in the Restatement (Third)
of Trusts, when drafted, will appear in section 94.26
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Relationships) observes:  “Although the promisee as well as the beneficiary may, in many
instances, sue upon a contract for the benefit of a third party . . . , a trust ordinarily cannot be
enforced by a settlor who is not also a beneficiary (see § 94).”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 5 cmt. i (2003).  The Reporter’s Notes add:
On the observation in this Comment about the usual inability of a settlor
who is not a beneficiary to enforce a trust, see the typical dictum in Dauer
v. Butera, . . . 642 N.E.2d 848, 850 ([Ill. App.] 1994):  “In the law of future
interests, it has been established that only those having a beneficial
interest in the subject matter and relief sought are proper parties to sue
a trustee.”  See also Note, “Right of a Settlor to Enforce a Private Trust,”
62 Harvard L. Rev. 1370 (1949).  For a careful and slightly broader
description of the settlor’s position, see Gaubatz, “Grantor Enforcement of
Trusts:  Standing in One Private Law Setting,” 62 N. Carolina L. Rev. 906
(1984), discussed in Sanders v. Citizens National Bank, 585 So.2d 1064,
1066 (1991) (holding that the settlor in the case lacked standing to sue);
and see also § 94 of this Restatement.
Id. § 5 reporter’s note on cmt. i.
27 See Steeneck v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 668 A.2d 688, 693 (Conn. 1995) (standing denied
to “life trustee” to challenge University of Bridgeport’s decision to affiliate with school founded
by Reverend Sun Myung Moon); see also Weaver v. Wood, 680 N.E.2d 918, 923 (Mass. 1997)
(holding that mere membership in Christian Science church or other public charity was not
enough to allow standing to contest mismanagement).
28 See, e.g., Romero v. Nw. Area Found., 129 Fed. App’x. 337, 339 (9th Cir. 2005)
(unpublished) (involving claim by prospective grantees of funds from grantor foundation).  The
court ruled:
Romero’s breach of contract claim fails because no contract was formed.
The facts as pled by Romero do not support the proposition that the
Foundation made a conditional offer, as required for contract formation.
At best, they support the proposition that the Foundation made a donative
promise with the incidental condition that community members participate
in the planning process.  It is axiomatic that incidental conditions attached
to donative promises do not transform promises of gifts into contracts.
Id. at 339.  The court, however, allowed a claim for promissory estoppel, suggesting that it
would allow “the plaintiffs to recover in a limited manner for incidental costs such as travel,
child-care, and time off work.”  Id. at 340.
29 Robert Schalkenbach Found. v. Lincoln Found., Inc., 91 P.3d 1019, 1030 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2004); accord In re Pub. Benevolent Trust, 829 N.E.2d 1039, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), adhered
Courts are being asked to consider, under the rubric of those with
a special interest, the standing of a range of private parties, not just
donors; regardless of the relationship between the plaintiff and the
charity, however, standing is rarely granted.27  The claims of
potential beneficiaries are uniquely hard to classify as direct or
indirect:  enforcing the terms of the trust can often be the same as
suing for the charity’s resources.28  Ordinarily, as noted in a recent
appellate court decision in Arizona, “mere potential beneficiaries . . .
lack standing as persons with a ‘special interest’ to enforce a
charitable trust.”29  The court declared:
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to on rehearing 834 N.E.2d 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
30 Robert Schalkenbach Found., 91 P.3d at 1024–25.
31 Id. at 1026.  Footnote 7 comments:
We give little, if any, weight to the nature of the acts complained of and
whether there are any allegations of fraud because any plaintiff can allege
such misconduct, regardless of the merits of the complaint.  If we found
that mere allegations of grave misconduct were sufficient to confer
standing, the purposes of limiting standing to protect trustees from
vexatious litigation would be undermined.  Where there are such
allegations, we presume that the availability of Attorney General
enforcement will suffice to remedy any alleged misconduct.
Id. at 1026 n.7.
32 Id. at 1026.  The court continued:  “For example, other jurisdictions have found a class
of students or faculty who could possibly receive a scholarship or be selected to an endowed
chair to be too large and remote to be a group with a special interest.”  Id. at 1026–27
(citations omitted).  The court added, “The Appellants do not set forth how many people may
be followers of Henry George, how easy or difficult it may be to become a follower of Henry
George, or how they are directly affected by the Foundation’s actions.”  Id. at 1027 n.11.
33 Id. at 1027.  Examining these factors the court observed:  “One such factor is whether
the actions concern the ongoing administration of the Foundation, or whether the Appellants
are claiming that the Foundation has taken an extraordinary action that would affect the
Appellants’ interest.”  Id.  Analyzing that factor, the court commented:
The allegation that the Foundation has been systematically diverting
funds implies that [one appellant] wishes to influence the daily operations
of the Foundation. . . .  Ultimately, the remedies that the Appellants wish
to impose are highly intrusive in the administration of the trust, which
could open the Foundation to further litigation by other potential or
Relying on treatises and decisions from other
jurisdictions, we hold that to have such common-law
standing, a party must show that they have a special
interest in the trust, such as being a current beneficiary,
and not merely being a potential or prior beneficiary of
a large class of potential beneficiaries.30
In ascertaining whether a claimed beneficiary has such a special
interest, that Arizona appellate court gave “special emphasis” to “the
nature of the benefitted class and its relationship to the trust, the
nature of the remedy requested, and the effectiveness of attorney
general enforcement of the trust.”31  The court also observed:  “More
important than numbers of class members is the manageability of
the size of the class, whether it can be easily entered, and whether
the plaintiff established that it has a direct interest in the operation
of the trust.”32  In addition, the court examined “other factors that
could leave the Foundation open to vexatious litigation.”33
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disappointed beneficiaries.
Id. at 1027–28.  The court highlighted the remedy sought:
Appellants seek to have a court order:  the Foundation to comply with the
terms of the trust; removal of the Foundation as the trustee and
appointment of a new trustee that would fulfill John C. Lincoln’s intent;
removal of one or more of the Foundation’s directors and appointment of
new directors that would fulfill John C. Lincoln’s intent.
Id. at 1027 n.13.
34 These cases have arisen in the context of corporate charities, but the courts in those
cases begin with trust principles.  See, e.g., Hooker v. Edes Home, 579 A.2d 608, 612 (D.C.
1999) (citing Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp Found., 479 N.E.2d 752 (N.Y. 1985)).  In Alco
Gravure, the Court of Appeals of New York declared:
Furthermore, the policy reasons for limiting standing in this area are not
applicable in this case.  Normally, standing to challenge actions by the
trustees of a charitable trust or corporation is limited to the
Attorney-General in order to prevent vexatious litigation and suits by
irresponsible parties who do not have a tangible stake in the matter and
have not conducted appropriate investigations.  However, the present
action concerns not the ongoing administration of a charitable corporation,
but the dissolution of that corporation and the complete elimination of the
individual plaintiffs’ status as preferred beneficiaries of the funds
originally donated by Joseph Knapp.  The individual plaintiffs, therefore,
have standing.
Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp Found., 479 N.E.2d 752, 756 (N.Y. 1985) (citation omitted).
Compare the discussion of donor standing in such a circumstance, in Part II.B.2, and of the
effect of nonprofit corporation statutes, in Part II.C of this Article.
35 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 5 (2003).
A few courts have granted standing under the extraordinary
circumstance of a significant change in purposes, when a defined
class of current or potential beneficiaries would no longer qualify as
such.34
2. Conditional Gifts Contrasted.  In a definitional section, the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts distinguishes trusts from other
relationships, including corporations, conditions and equitable
charges, and contracts to convey or certain contracts for the benefit
of third parties.35  In distinguishing trusts from conditions and
equitable charges, the Third Restatement comments, in part:
An owner of property may transfer it, inter vivos or by
will, to another person and provide that, if the latter
should commit or fail to perform a specified act, the
transferred interest shall be forfeited. . . .  On breach of
the condition, the transferor, the successors in interest of
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36 Id. § 5, cmt. h (emphases added).
37 See supra notes 8–20 and accompanying text.
38 The court quoted an earlier appellate decision observing:
Courts favor the construction of a gift as a trust over a conditional gift for
several reasons. Because forfeiture is a harsh remedy, any ambiguity is
resolved against it.  Moreover, the transferor’s objective is to use the
transferee to confer a benefit upon the public.  To ensure that the benefit
is conferred as intended, the transferor ordinarily wants the intended
beneficiary to be able to enforce that intent. Because the only remedy for
the breach of a condition is a forfeiture, a condition is not a very effective
method of accomplishing those goals.  For both of those reasons, courts will
generally construe a conveyance as one upon trust rather than upon
condition.
L.B. Research & Educ. Found. v. UCLA Found., 29 Cal Rptr. 3d 710, 714 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(citations omitted) (quoting City of Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859
(Cal. App. 1999)).  See also SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 24, § 401.1 (“The mere fact that the
trustees of a charitable trust commit a breach of trust does not cause the trust to fail and
entitle the settlor or his successors to enforce a resulting trust.  This is true not only where the
trustees merely neglect to apply the property to the designated charitable purposes, but also
where they divert it to other purposes.  In such a case, if it is not impossible or impracticable
the transferor, or some designated person will be entitled
to recover the property from the transferee.
In situations of these types the interests of the
transferee are subject to a condition subsequent and are
not held in trust.  The condition does not create a
fiduciary relationship.  Unlike a trust beneficiary’s right
to compel performance of a trustee’s duties, neither the
transferor nor a person to be benefited may compel or
prevent performance of the act upon which a condition
depends, nor can they have the transferee removed and
replaced by another. . . .
Whether a property transfer accompanied by a
requirement for the performance of a particular act gives
rise to a trust or a condition depends on the manifested
intention of the transferor.  The mere fact that the word
“condition” is used is not necessarily determinative.36
The California appellate court in L.B. Research & Education
Foundation, described in Part I.A. of this Article,37 explained that the
undesirability of the reversion remedy available in cases of
conditional charitable gifts leads courts to construe the transaction
as a charitable trust when possible.38  Moreover, as discussed in Part
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to carry out the designated purposes, the remedy is by a suit brought by the Attorney General
to compel the trustees to perform the trust, and not by a suit brought by the settlor or his
successors to enforce a resulting trust.  It is only where the settlor has made the continuance
of the trust conditional on the performance of the trust that the failure to perform results in
the termination of the trust and the reverter of the trust property to the settlor or his estate.”
(footnotes omitted)).
39 See infra notes 195–252.
40 L.B. Research & Educ. Found., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 715 (citing City of Palm Springs v.
Living Desert Reserve, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859, 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)).
41 See, e.g., Arman v. Bank of Am., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (daughter of
named individual charitable trustee has no standing to challenge successor trustee appointed
by  court in accordance with proposal made by attorney general and bank chosen as trustee).
The Arman court explained:
The fact that [the settlor] Lamerdin was willing to entrust his assets to an
individual inexperienced in administering charitable funds or creating tax
exempt foundations does not mean that the court is free to do the same.
There is no dispute that Lamerdin did not want a bank, a trust company,
a charitable corporation, or other large impersonal organization to be the
trustee – he wanted Elvira Arman.  But acknowledging that still left the
trial court with the question of what to do with funds left for a charitable
purpose after the testator’s specified trustee has died. The court’s primary
focus must be to ensure that funds intended for charitable purposes are in
safe hands and properly administered.  Rarely will this entail transferring
funds to an individual, even one who is as close to the testator and his
intended trustee as appellant. Appellant was not named by Lamerdin as
a trustee, and she had no evidence to suggest that his will could be
interpreted to insert her name as successor trustee in place of her
mother’s.
Id. at 415.
42 Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932, 937 (Cal. 1964).
But see Lundberg v. Coleman, 60 P.3d 595, 600 (Wash. 2002) (holding that director of
IV of this Article,39  the court cautioned that “when the agreement
is a contract subject to a condition subsequent and does not create
a charitable trust, the Attorney General is not a necessary party to
the action.”40
3. Visitors and Trust Protectors.  Co-trustees are in a class by
themselves under the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, but the
standing of a trustee does not pass to the trustee’s heirs.41  Relying
on trust doctrine, the California Supreme Court in Holt v. College of
Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons extended co-trustee standing
rules to the co-directors of a charitable corporation, concluding:
“There is no sound reason why minority directors or ‘trustees’ of a
charitable corporation cannot maintain an action against majority
trustees when minority trustees of a charitable trust are so
empowered.”42  There may be situations when a co-trustee or director
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nonmember nonprofit corporation does not have standing to bring derivative action on behalf
of corporation against other directors for breach of fiduciary duties).
43 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 350 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007)
(describing situations that give rise to obligation to take action).
44 Page v. Hull Univ. Visitor, (1992) 1 Eng. Rep. 97, 102 (H.L.) (Lord Browne-Wilkinson,
opinion).  The visitor’s decision may not be appealed to the courts.  “The value of the visitorial
jurisdiction is that it is swift, cheap and final.”  Id. at 100 (Lord Griffiths, opinion).
45 See COURTNEY S. KENNY, THE PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATION WITH REGARD TO PROPERTY
GIVEN FOR CHARITABLE OR OTHER PUBLIC USE 147 (1880) (quoting the 1835 complaint of one
English Charity Commissioner:  “[I]n most cases, [visitors] are a burden and inconvenience to
the Charity, because the Visitors, being exempted from the jurisdiction of the Court of
Chancery, are not subject to any control as to the internal management of the Charity in any
respect; and it frequently happens that the advantage which might be derived from the
visitorial power is wholly lost, because Charities subject to it are not at all looked into by the
special visitors’ ”).
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. f (1957).  However, the Second
Restatement acknowledges:  “The law as to the power of visitors of a charitable corporation is
not within the scope of the Restatement of this Subject.”  Id. § 391 cmt. g.
47 John T. Gaubatz, Grantor Enforcement of Trusts:  Standing in One Private Law Setting,
62 N.C. L. REV. 905, 926 (1984).
has the obligation, not just the standing, to sue to prevent a breach
of fiduciary duty by a co-fiduciary.43
In England, the founder of a corporate charity may “reserve to
himself or to a visitor whom he appoints the exclusive right to
adjudicate upon the domestic laws which the founder has
established for the regulation of his bounty.”44  Such a “visitor” not
only has the right to ensure proper management of the charity, but
also displaces the authority of the chancery courts.45 
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts does mention that “the
founder of a charitable corporation may have a visitorial power
which is not applicable to charitable trusts.”46  Notably, Professor
John Gaubatz comments:
[T]he reason for appointing visitors is to ensure that the
benefits intended to pass to the public in fact do so,
without requiring intervention of the attorney
general—a protective function similar to that of a
cotrustee, but without the latter’s active duties. . . .  The
cases recognizing that standing validate the importance
of the grantor’s intent in identifying those who will have
standing to enforce the trust.47
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48 See generally FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING, supra note 6, 338–42 (surveying visitorships
in American law).  But cf. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.3(a), (d)–(e) (McKinney 2002)
(allowing anyone “founding, endowing and maintaining . . . a public library, museum or
educational institution” in trust to exercise complete control over administration of trust
during his or her lifetime, and, if granted, to pass on these rights to surviving spouse, without
any obligation to account).
49 See, e.g., Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 403 S.W.2d 340, 347 (Tex. 1966) (“In the
trust indenture before us, Mr. Rice reserved during his lifetime the power to direct and control
the investments of the Endowment Fund ‘and the management of the said Institute.’  Then
Mr. Rice added a general power of visitation by the courts.”).
50 Karst, supra note 6, at 446.
51 See Wier v. Howard Hughes Med. Inst., 407 A.2d 1051, 1057 (Del. 1979) (quoting
GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 416 (2d ed.
1978) (“In a country such as the United States, where primogeniture is obsolete, the vesting
of a power of visitation in the heirs of a donor is not desirable. . . .  [I]n many cases they would
be either wholly uninterested in exercising the right of visitation, or would be openly hostile
to the institution which deprived them of a part or all of the fortune of their relatives.”).
52 See, e.g., Assoc. Alumni of Gen. Theological Seminary of the Protestant Episcopal
Church in the U.S. v. Gen. Theological Seminary of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the
U.S., 57 N.E. 626, 627 (N.Y. 1900) (holding that in absence of right of reverter, donor was not
entitled to return of gift; “though, as donor and possessor of the right to nominate to the
professorship, it had sufficient standing to maintain an action to enforce the trust”).  The
Smithers court relied on this case in holding that the donor’s rights regarding investment and
other matters would have bestowed standing on him, and held that standing passed to his
widow in her capacity as executrix.  Smithers v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d
426, 435 (App. Div. 2001); see also infra note 68 and accompanying text.
53 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 64(2) (2003); see also id. cmt. d & notes on cmts.
b–d (discussing powers and liabilities of third parties).
However, American law typically rejects the English concept of
visitorship.48  (This should not be confused with what some refer to
as the visitorial power of the courts over both charitable trusts and
charitable corporations.49)  Indeed, Professor Kenneth Karst would
hold a “swift[ ] burial of the doctrine of visitation on the basis that
it did not permit directors to direct.”50  That the English right is
hereditary makes it even less appealing in the United States.51
Nevertheless, a recent trend that bears watching is the use of
“trust protectors” in the administration and enforcement of private
trusts.  Compare cases in which the grantor of a restricted charitable
gift, by the terms of the instrument, enjoyed rights of consultation.52
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts provides:  “The terms of a trust
may grant a third party a power with respect to termination of
modification of the trust; such a third-party power is presumed to be
held in a fiduciary capacity.”53  Professor Gaubatz observes:
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54 Gaubatz, supra note 47, at 939.  Professor Gaubatz added: 
[V]isitors—whose standing to enforce a trust is similarly the result of the
grantor’s appointment—are not clearly liable for failing to correct abuses
by the trustees of the charities for which they are appointed; evidently,
they have the power to enforce the trust, but not the duty to do so.
Id. at 940.
55 See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 647 (1819)
(observing that philanthropy was founded on hope that funds would “flow forever in the
channel which the givers have marked out for it”).  Justice Marshall wrote of those who found
charitable corporations:  “One great inducement to these gifts is the conviction felt by the
giver, that the disposition he makes of them is immutable.”  Id. at 647.
56 See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5547(a) (2006) (“Every nonprofit corporation incorporated
for a charitable purpose or purposes may take, receive and hold such real and personal
property as may be given, devised to, or otherwise vested in such corporation, in trust, for the
purpose or purposes set forth in its articles.  The board of directors or other body of the
corporation shall, as trustees of such property, be held to the same degree of responsibility and
accountability as if not incorporated . . . .”).  Separate from the question of the corporate
charity’s obligation to honor a restriction is the potential liability of the corporation’s directors.
The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act explicitly rejects the view that directors of
corporate charities are trustees, providing that “[a] director shall not be deemed to be a trustee
with respect to the corporation or with respect to any property held or administered by the
corporation, including without limit, property that may be subject to restrictions imposed by
the donor or transferor of such property.”  REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(e)
(1987).  The Comments explain that “the corporation, as distinguished from its director, may
hold or be deemed to hold property in trust or subject to restrictions.”  Id. § 8.30 cmt. 1.  Even
in states that do not treat directors as trustees, a breach of a gift restriction can, depending
upon the circumstances, reflect wrongdoing by the charity, its fiduciaries, or both.
The difficulty with explaining the grantor’s standing
by analogizing his position to that of a trustee is that the
explanation proves too much.  Trustees have fiduciary
obligations in exercising the oversight power. . . .  Mere
retention of an oversight power, on the other hand,
suggests only the grantor’s desire that he have the right
to correct trustee abuses, not the duty to do so.54
B. RESTRICTED GIFTS TO CORPORATE CHARITIES:  DRAWING ON TRUST
DOCTRINE
1. Effect of Restriction.  The treatment of restricted gifts made to
corporate charities varies in theory among the states, but not in
effect.  Generally, the charity has a duty to adhere to the
restriction.55  Some legislatures have declared that a charitable
nonprofit corporation is deemed to be a trust and its board of
directors to be trustees.56  In other states it is the courts that treat
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57 See Duties of Charitable Trust Trustees and Charitable Corporation Directors, 2 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 545, 546 (1967).
58 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (2003).  The Restatement (Second) of Trusts
provided general commentary addressing corporate charities, including the following relevant
paragraphs:
Ordinarily the principles and rules applicable to charitable trusts are
applicable to charitable corporations.  Where property is given to a
charitable corporation without restrictions as to the disposition of the
property, the corporation is under a duty, enforceable at the suit of the
Attorney General, not to divert the property to other purposes but to apply
it to one or more of the charitable purposes for which it is organized.
Where property is given to a charitable corporation and it is directed by the
terms of the gift to devote the property to a particular one of its purposes,
it is under a duty, enforceable at the suit of the Attorney General, to devote
the property to that purpose.  Where property is given to a charitable
corporation and it is provided by the terms of the gift that it shall retain
the principal and devote the income only to the accomplishment of its
purposes or one of its purposes, the corporation is under a duty,
enforceable at the suit of the Attorney General, to retain the principal and
to use the income for the designated purposes.
The doctrine of cy pres . . . is applicable to gifts to charitable
corporations as well as to gifts to individual trustees for charitable
purposes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. f (1957).  Cf. supra note 26 and accompanying
text (showing distinction in Restatement (Third) of Trusts between trust and conditional gift).
the charitable class served by the corporate charity as the
beneficiaries of a trust.57
Commentary to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts declares that it
covers those gifts made to corporate charities that carry restrictions,
but not gifts made for a corporate charity’s general purposes:
An outright devise[ ] or donation to a nonproprietary
hospital or university or other charitable institution,
expressly or impliedly to be used for its general
purposes, is charitable but does not create a trust as that
term is used in this Restatement.  A disposition to such
an institution for a specific purpose, however, such as to
support medical research, perhaps on a particular
disease, or to establish a scholarship fund in a certain
field of study, creates a charitable trust of which the
institution is the trustee for purposes of the terminology
and rules of this Restatement.58
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59 E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 69 (2003) (“If the legal title to the trust
property and the entire beneficial interest become united in one person, the trust
terminates.”).  But see, e.g., Epworth Children’s Home v. Beasley, 616 S.E.2d 710, 718 (S.C.
2005) (rejecting application of merger to charitable trust in which charity as both trustee and
beneficiary was limited to enjoying only income from bequest each year).
60 St. Joseph’s Hosp. v. Bennett, 22 N.E.2d 305, 307 (N.Y. 1939).
61 Id. at 308; see also N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 513 (McKinney 2005) (codifying
St. Joseph’s Hospital result); infra notes 171–80 and accompanying text (discussing cy pres).
Applying trust law generally to corporate charities, however,
conflicts with the venerable trust doctrine of merger, in which the
trust vanishes if the beneficiary and trustee are the same person.59
Notably, at a time when charitable trusts were illegal in New York,
the state high court saved charitable corporations by ruling:  “The
corporation uses the property, in accordance with the law of its
creation, for its own purposes; and the dictation of the manner of its
use, within the law by the donor, does not affect its ownership or
make it a trustee.  A person . . . cannot be a trustee for himself.”60
Nevertheless, the court held:
No authority has been brought to our attention that a
gift to a charitable corporation with the express direction
that it be applied to a specific corporate purpose in a
specific manner may be accepted by the corporation, and
then used for a different corporate purpose in a different
manner. . . .  [The charitable corporation may not]
receive a gift made for one purpose and use it for
another, unless the court applying the cy pres doctrine so
commands.61
A Florida appellate court explained the policy difficulties in even
stronger language:
Making a gift to a charity for a specific project or purpose
does not create a charitable trust.  For this court to
suggest that it does would create havoc for charitable
institutions.  A charity has to be able to know when a
donation is a gift and when it is merely an offer to fund
a trust for which the charity is taking on fiduciary
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62 Persan v. Life Concepts, Inc., 738 So. 2d 1008, 1010 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
63 See 4A SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 24, § 348.1 (“Thus where the property is left by will
to a charitable corporation, whether it may be used for the general purposes of the corporation
or whether the devise or bequest is subject to restrictions as to its use, and the property is
conveyed by the executor to the corporation, the corporation is not thereafter bound to account
as if it were a testamentary trustee.  The situation is different from that which arises where
property is left by will to individual trustees, or to a trust company, charged with a duty to
make the property productive and to pay the income to a charitable corporation.”).
64 City of Paterson v. Paterson Gen. Hosp., 235 A.2d 487, 495 (N.J. Super. Ch. Ct. Div.
1967).  Similarly, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held, in accordance with the
parties’ assumptions regarding the law, that the rules that apply to beneficiaries of charitable
trusts govern standing with regard to beneficiaries of a charitable corporation.  Hooker v. Edes
Home, 579 A.2d 608, 611 n.8 (D.C. 1999).
65 Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 998 (Conn. 1997)
(quoting Lefkowitz v. Lebensfeld, 417 N.Y.S.2d 715, 720 (App. Div. 1979)) (citing Wier v.
responsibilities.  The creation of such a trust must be
express.62
More practically, a restricted gift (particularly if not made by will)
does not impose on the corporate charity the trust law procedural
requirements for providing information to beneficiaries (although
the charity would have to respond to a request for information from
the attorney general) and for judicial accounting.63
2. Standing of Donor of Restricted Gift.  “The rule that parties
especially interested may sue to compel performance is as applicable
to the law of charitable corporations as to the law of charitable
trusts.”64  However, this generally means that courts have extended
the settlor’s traditional lack of standing to donors who make
restricted gifts (not in trust) to corporate charities, again leaving
enforcement to the attorney general in all but the unusual case.
This typical common law approach to donors is articulated in the
Connecticut Supreme Court decision in Carl J. Herzog Foundation,
Inc. v. University of Bridgeport: 
[While] “a donor who attaches conditions to his gift has
a right to have [h]is intention enforced” . . . [it] is
enforceable only at the instance of the attorney general;
and the donor himself has no standing to enforce the
terms of his gift when he has not retained a specific right
to control the property, such as a right of reverter, after
relinquishing physical possession of it.65
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Howard Hughes Med. Inst., 407 A.2d 1051, 1057 (Del. Ch. 1979)) (other citations omitted).
66 Id. at 999 n.5.  See also Browne v. Abdelhak, No. CIV. A. 98-6688, 2000 WL 1201889
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2000) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring federal racketeering
action for misuse of endowment funds absent evidence of injury).
67 See infra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
68 See Smithers v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426, 435 (App. Div. 2001)
(granting standing to widow as executrix of donor’s estate).  The Marcus court allowed suit for
false charitable solicitation brought by a group of supporters of a greater Israel—that is, one
augmented by settlements in territories acquired after the Six-Day War.  The defendant
charity’s fundraising material used a map of Israel that included the territories, although in
fact the charity intended to spend (and for the last twenty years had only spent) donated funds
in territories within the pre-War “Green Line.”  Marcus v. Jewish Nat’l Fund, 557 N.Y.S.2d
886, 889 (App. Div. 1990).  The dissent asserted:
[T]he defendant has no obligation to use its funds other than in accordance
with its charter.  There is no contention that the funds are not used for a
purpose for which the defendant is organized.  Plaintiffs would have the
defendant cover all bases while the defendant is satisfied to cover only a
portion thereof.  Plaintiffs are not deceived, rather they are unsatisfied.
Id. at 891 (Kupferman, J., dissenting).  In contrast, see In re Alaimo:  “Respondent, decedent’s
grandson and a person in whose honor the trust was created, lacks standing to challenge
petitioners’ administration of the trust.  Rather, standing to enforce the trust or challenge
petitioners’ administration of it is restricted to the Attorney General.”  In re Alaimo, 732
N.Y.S.2d 819 (App. Div. 2001) (citations omitted).
69 723 N.Y.S.2d 426 (App. Div. 2001).  See the thorough treatment of this case in Iris J.
Goodwin, Donor Standing to Enforce Charitable Gifts:  Civil Society vs. Donor Empowerment,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1093 (2005).
The court further noted:
By expressly reserving a property interest such as a
right of reverter, the donor of the gift or the settlor of the
trust may bring himself and his heirs within the “special
interest” exception to the general rule that beneficiaries
of a charitable trust may not bring an action to enforce
the trust, but rather are represented exclusively by the
attorney general.66
That case further held that Connecticut’s adoption of the Uniform
Management of Institutional Funds Act did not expand donor
standing.67
In contrast to this traditional approach, two recent New York
appellate panels (in split decisions) granted standing to donors or
their successors, while a third rejected it.68  Notably, in Smithers v.
St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center,69 an appellate court stunned
the nonprofit world by granting standing to a donor’s widow—as a
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70 The New York Surrogate’s Court subsequently granted attorneys’ fees to Mrs.
Smithers-Fornaci out of her husband’s estate, over the opposition of the attorney general and
several charitable remainder beneficiaries.  See In re Estate of Smithers, 760 N.Y.S.2d 304,
308 (Sur. Ct. 2003) (“To deny this court the right to award reasonable counsel fees to this
fiduciary would vitiate the right of a private cause of action created by the Appellate Division.
Of course, the fiduciary does not possess a blank check to frolic far afield from her duties to the
estate.  The court never loses the right to examine a request for attorney’s fees and each case
must be decided on the unique facts presented.”).
71 Smithers, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 435–36.
72 Id. at 442 (Friedman, J., dissenting).  The dissent agreed with the majority that
Smithers himself had retained enough approval rights that he would have had standing to
enforce, but disagreed that these rights continued in the representative of his estate.  Id. at
441.
73 The settlement document has not been made public, and reports of its terms vary.  The
agreement requires St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital to transfer either $6 million (according to
the New York Sun) or $8 million (according to the Daily News) either to the estate of R.
Brinkley Smithers (according to the Sun) or to another charity for the original purpose
(according to the Chronicle of Philanthropy).  Adam Cataldo, St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Settles
Smithers Suit, N.Y. SUN, Oct. 23, 2003, at 2; William Sherman, Rehab Center on Mend with
$8M Settlement, DAILY NEWS (New York), Oct. 22, 2003, at 55.  Smithers’s original gift was $10
million, which the hospital spent for a residential rehabilitation facility that it sold for more
than $14 million.  Stephen G. Green, N.Y. Hospital Settles Case Filed by Donor’s Widow,
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Wash. D.C.), Oct. 30, 2003, at 14.  The hospital is obligated to use the
remainder of the sale proceeds for its substance-abuse programs, but the hospital may no
longer use the Smithers name.  Id.; see also Tina Susman, Gift-Givers Keeping Closer Tabs,
NEWSDAY (New York), Oct. 24, 2003, at A26 (discussing Smithers case).
74 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. §§ 240, 245 (Preliminary Draft No. 3,
court-appointed representative of her husband’s estate—to challenge
a new use of his restricted gift proposed by the donee charity and
approved by the attorney general.70  The three-judge majority
opinion declared:  “We conclude that the distinct but related
interests of the donor and the Attorney General are best served by
continuing to accord standing to donors to enforce the terms of their
own gifts concurrent with the Attorney General’s standing to enforce
such gifts on behalf of the beneficiaries thereof.”71  The dissent
worried that:  “By determining that plaintiff may pursue the instant
action, the majority necessarily concludes that a decedent’s estate,
which has no interest in a gift, may prevent the New York State
Attorney General from exercising his discretion in determining how
to prosecute alleged violations of law.”72  The matter settled in
September 2003.73
A separate issue arises with respect to the possible standing of
the donor of an unrestricted gift to a corporate charity that changes
its charitable purpose.74  Presumably standing is doubly unavailable:
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2005); see also Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp Found., 479 N.E.2d 752, 763 (N.Y. 1985) (Jasen,
J., dissenting) (“Scholarly commentary supports the view that amendment of the corporate
charter by the trustees of a charitable corporation, in an effort to change a corporate purpose,
is a legitimate alternative to the cy pres doctrine.”); supra notes 22–34 and accompanying text
(discussing beneficiary standing in such circumstances).
75 See Samuel W. Brauer et al., No Trespassing:  Donors Lack Legal Standing to Challenge
Corporate Acts of Florida Not-for-Profit Corporations, 75 FLA. B.J. 50, 51–52 (2001).  Compare
the denial of a donor’s petition to intervene in a lawsuit brought against a Catholic archdiocese
by a victim of priestly sexual abuse.  Fortier v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No.
CV030475096, 2005 WL 758113 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2005).  The Fortier court explained:
Carried to its logical extreme, if Frechette’s position is accepted, every
Catholic in the state who contributes to the Archdiocese would have a right
to intervene since he or she could argue that the value or worth of his
contribution is diminished if assets are diverted by the archdiocese to
satisfy a successful judgment in one of these cases – less money might be
available to accomplish a particular charitable purpose that any
contributing Catholic might be interested in and which motivated the
contribution in the first place.
Id. at *4.
76 UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 7, 7A U.L.A. 35 (2006).
77 Id. § 1(1).
78 Id. § 7(a).
because donors generally do not have standing and have no special
interest, and because, having made an unrestricted gift, the donor
would not have retained a right to bring the action.75
C. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS
1. Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act (UMIFA)
(1972).  Since its adoption in 1972 by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), the Uniform
Management of Institutional Funds Act, enacted in forty-seven
states and the District of Columbia, has provided a mechanism for
releasing donor restrictions on institutional funds.76  Generally, an
“institution” is an organization formed and operated exclusively for
educational, religious, charitable, or other eleemosynary purposes.77
(UMIFA, more broadly, has had a liberating effect on charity
investment management practices.)
Section 7(a) of UMIFA provides that, with the donor’s written
consent, the charity’s “governing board may release, in whole or in
part, a restriction imposed by the applicable gift instrument on the
use or investment of an institutional fund.”78  If written consent
cannot be obtained because of the donor’s death, disability,
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79 Id. § 7(b).
80 Id.
81 Id.  See also infra notes 171–80 and accompanying text for additional discussion.
82 Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 1001 (Conn. 1997).
unavailability, or impossibility of identification, then the governing
board may apply to the court for release of the restriction.79  The
charity must notify the attorney general, who may intervene.80  The
court may release any restriction, in whole or in part, that it finds to
be “obsolete, inappropriate, or impracticable,” a test that was
intended to be more flexible than the then-understood cy pres
standard.81
In Carl J. Herzog Foundation, however, the Connecticut Supreme
Court held that UMIFA Section 7 (Release of Restriction in Gift
Instrument) does not give a donor standing to bring a lawsuit in a
case where the charity unilaterally altered the restriction over the
objection of the donor and the attorney general did not take action.82
The court explained:
In the comment to § 7, the drafters of UMIFA expressly
provided that the donor of a completed gift would not
have standing to enforce the terms of the gift.  “The
donor has no right to enforce the restriction, no interest
in the fund and no power to change the eleemosynary
beneficiary of the fund.  He may only acquiesce in a
lessening of a restriction already in effect.”
These clear comments regarding the power of a donor
to enforce restrictions on a charitable gift arose in the
context of debate concerning the creation of potential
adverse tax consequences for donors, if UMIFA was
interpreted to provide donors with control over their gift
property after the completion of the gift.  Pursuant to
§ 170(a) of the Internal Revenue Code and § 1.170A-1(c)
of the Treasury Regulations, an income tax deduction for
a charitable contribution is disallowed unless the
taxpayer has permanently surrendered “dominion and
control” over the property or funds in question.  Where
there is a possibility not “so remote as to be negligible”
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83 Id. at 1001 (citation omitted).
84 Id. at 1002.  In omitted footnote 11, the court cites to the amicus brief filed by
educational associations, which “persuasively posits that, should the establishment of donor
standing become the law, the infinite variety of charitable gift restrictions that affect
educational institutions would create the potential for a flood of ‘time-consuming, fact-sensitive
litigation.’ ”  Id. at 1002 n.11.
that the charitable gift subject to a condition might fail,
the tax deduction is disallowed.83
This result must have been particularly galling to the plaintiff, itself
a charity.  Even if such a remote contingency were a concern (the
Treasury regulations declare remote contingencies irrelevant in
determining whether a gift is complete), a donor that is itself a
charity does not need a charitable-contribution deduction.
The Herzog Foundation court commented:
[I]t would have been anomalous for the drafters of
UMIFA to strive to assist charitable institutions by
creating smoother procedural avenues for the release of
restrictions while simultaneously establishing standing
for a new class of litigants, donors, who would defeat this
very purpose by virtue of the potential of lengthy and
complicated litigation.84
The two-judge dissent tersely stated:
The majority here holds that the donor itself may not
enforce a restriction in a gift to an educational
institution when the institution had specifically agreed
to that restriction.  This decision is simply an approval
of a donee, in the words of the donor, “double crossing
the donor,” and doing it with impunity unless an elected
attorney general does something about it.
This decision will not encourage donations to
Connecticut colleges and universities.  I fail to see why
Connecticut, the home of so many respected schools that
would honor their promises, should endorse such sharp
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85 Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting).
86 According to NCCUSL’s website, as of March 26, 2007, the statute has been enacted in
Alabama, Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming.  Unif. Law Comm’rs, A Few Facts
About the Uniform Trust Code, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/unifor
macts-fs-utc2000.asp (last visited June 20, 2007).  Note that Arizona adopted, but then
repealed, the UTC, although evidently for reasons unrelated to the rules on charitable trusts.
Id.
87 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c), 7C U.L.A. 61 (2000); see also Ronald Chester, Grantor
Standing to Enforce Charitable Transfers Under Section 405(c) of the Uniform Trust Code and
Related Law:  How Important Is It and How Extensive Should It Be?, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 611, 628 (2003) (criticizing Herzog Foundation rule that denied foundation standing).
88 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 410(b), 7C U.L.A. 495.  Section 410(b) of the Uniform Trust Code
ends:  “The settlor of a charitable trust may maintain a proceeding to modify the trust under
Section 413.”  Id.  Commentary provides:  “Contrary to Restatement (Second) of Trusts section
391 (1959), subsection (b) grants a settlor standing to petition the court under Section 413 to
apply cy pres to modify the settlor’s charitable trust.”  Id. § 440 cmt., 7C U.L.A. 496.
89 See, for example, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3303 (2001 & Supp. 2006), which the
legislature amended in 2005 by adding:  “A settlor may maintain an action to enforce a
charitable trust under this section and may designate a person or persons, whether or not born
at the time of such designation, to enforce a charitable trust under this section.”  Id.
practices and create a climate in this state that will have
a chilling effect on gifts to its educational institutions.85
2. Uniform Trust Code (2000).  The NCCUSL adopted the
Uniform Trust Code in 2000, amending it in 2001, 2003, 2004, and
2005; it has been enacted in nineteen states and the District of
Columbia.86  Evidently, it was unhappiness over the result in Herzog
Foundation that prompted the drafters of the Uniform Trust Code
to provide that the “settlor of a charitable trust, among others, may
maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust.”87  Similarly, in
deliberate contrast to the common law, the Uniform Trust Code
permits a settlor to initiate a cy pres proceeding.88
No cases have yet been decided under the Uniform Trust Code’s
settlor-standing provisions.  The statutory provisions’ lack of nuance
and specificity raises concerns that should have been addressed in
the legislative process, especially if standing were to be extended to
donors of restricted gifts to corporate charities.  Should there be a
dollar threshold to protect charities from nuisance suits?  Should
private standing be limited to the donor only, or should it be
expanded to the donor’s successors-in-interest and certain other
parties?89  Even if only the donor is granted standing, do we still
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90 See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
91 For documents prepared and comments submitted during the course of this project, visit
the NCCUSL Archives on the University of Pennsylvania Law School Library’s website.
Biddle Law Library Archives:  NCCUSL Drafts and Final Acts, http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
ulc/ulc.htm#umoifa (last visited June 20, 2007) [hereinafter NCCUSL Drafts and Final Acts].
92 As an invited observer to this project, I attended the November 2002 meeting at which
this provision was considered.  See generally Susan N. Gary, Charities, Endowments, and
Donor Intent: The Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, 41 GA. L. REV.
1277 (2007) (discussing, as reporter, the revision project). 
need a time limit to address gifts made by institutional donors, such
as family foundations, which never die?  If the gift instrument
provides for standing for the donor and for designated others, are
there any public policy limits on who those private enforcers can be?
More generally, do the answers depend on whether the restriction
has become impossible to carry out—that is, whether this is a
modification proceeding or an allegation of breach by the charity?
The cases that seem to raise judicial sympathies are usually the
latter.90
3. Revised UMIFA:  The Uniform Prudent Management of
Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA) (2006).  Some of these questions
of statutory design arose during the course of the project by
NCCUSL to revise and restate UMIFA.91  In contrast to the Uniform
Trust Code, the UMIFA revision project considered including, but
did not pursue, a grant of donor standing.92  Specifically, the October
2002 draft included a Section 8, titled “Enforcement of Restricted
Gifts,” which read as follows:
(a) If a gift instrument restricts the use of assets
transferred to an institution, then the donor may
maintain a proceeding to enforce the restriction on the
gift.
(b) Any right held by the donor under subsection (a)
may be exercised on the donor’s behalf by his [or her]
conservator or guardian or by the personal
representative of the donor’s estate.
(c) A donor’s right to maintain a proceeding under
subsection (a) is limited to enforcing the restriction on
the donor’s gift and does not give a donor standing to
challenge other actions by the governing board.
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93 UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT (200-) § 8 (Draft Oct. 20, 2002), available at
http:// www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/umoifa/draft1102.pdf.
94 Id. § 8 reporter’s note.  The draft Reporter’s Notes for section 8 of UMIFA (200-) began:
If the donor has included a restriction on the gift in the gift instrument,
the donor does not need to reserve a right of reverter or a right to redirect
in the gift instrument.  In Herzog, Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University
of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997), the court stated that unless a
donor not only restricted the uses to which the gift could be put but also
reserved a right of reverter or a right to redirect the gift to the restricted
purposes, the donor lacked standing to enforce the restriction.  The donor
should not have to do both.
Section 8 is provided in addition to any other rights available by law,
including rights to standing under a relator statute, see, e.g., CAL. CORP
CODE § 5142(a) (West 1990), or rights that persons with special interests
may have.  The rights granted to donors under this section are in addition
to rights vested in the state attorney general.
With few exceptions, only a state attorney general has had the right to
enforce breaches of fiduciary duties, including failure to carry out an
institution’s purposes, for charitable trusts and nonprofit corporations.
Courts have occasionally permitted persons with “special interests” in an
(d) A donor may maintain a proceeding under
subsection (a) only if the gift to be enforced had a value
that was either (i) greater than [$500,000] at the time
the donor made the gift or (ii) greater than [5%] of the
value of the assets of the institution at the time the
donor begins the proceeding.
(e) A donor’s right to maintain a proceeding under
subsection (a) ceases [30 years] after the date of the last
donation that was subject to the restriction.93
The Reporter’s Notes to this draft concluded:
The right to maintain a proceeding under this section
is limited to the gift itself and cannot extend to other
decisions of a governing board.  For example, if a donor
made a gift to a nursing school to provide scholarships to
nursing students and the institution that operated the
nursing school decided to close the nursing school, the
donor could not challenge the decision to close the
nursing school but could challenge the use of the donor’s
gift for purposes other than scholarships to nursing
students.94
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institution to maintain proceeding. . . . Scholars have discussed the
advantages and disadvantages of this doctrine. . . . Section 8 neither
expands nor abrogates the special interests doctrine.  Section 8 grants
standing to a donor only if the donor has, in a gift instrument[,] restricted
the purposes to which the gift can be put. 
Id.
95 Memorandum from Susan Gary to UMIFA Drafting Comm. (Oct. 20, 2002), available
at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/umoifa/memo1102.pdf.
96 Id.
In her cover memorandum to the UMIFA Drafting Committee
describing this draft, project reporter Susan Gary indicated that
draft Section 8 raised questions:  “Is it appropriate to add
conservator or guardian?  Should the donor’s right be extended to
heirs?”95  She also explained:
This new section creates limited donor standing. A
donor can enforce a restricted gift, but only if the gift
instrument contains the restriction.  The statute
includes both a temporal limit (at some number of years
after a gift the right to enforce ceases) and a monetary
limit (the gift must be of a sufficient size to warrant
giving the donor standing).  The intent is to allow the
donor of a significant gift to enforce the terms of the gift,
but not give standing to every donor.
The statute creates standing in the donor under these
limited circumstances rather than using a relator
approach.  An alternative would be to write the relator
concept into the statute.  Using relators requires the
involvement of the attorney general.  It did not seem
necessary, and perhaps not desirable, to require the
involvement of the attorney general for the limited
purposes identified here.
The Comments should address the issue of the degree
to which the restriction must be stated. What will the
effect of the charity’s statements in solicitation materials
be?96
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97 See, e.g., NCCUSL Drafts and Final Acts, supra note 91 (showing numerous drafts and
their evolution).
98 UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6(a) (2006), available at http://
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/umoifa/2006final_act.htm.
99 City of Picayune v. S. Reg’l Corp., 916 So. 2d 510, 528 (Miss. 2005).
Subsequent drafts of the UMIFA revision did not contain a donor-
standing provision.97
Separately, however, the final version of the revision—now
dubbed the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds
Act (UPMIFA), adopted by the Commissioners in July
2006—permits a restriction not only to be released with the consent
of the donor, but also to be modified with the consent of the donor,
so long as the new use is for a charitable purpose of the donee’s.98
4. Nonprofit Corporation Statutes.  Many nonprofit corporation
statutes are silent on the issue of standing—and none focuses on the
specific issue of restricted gifts, as distinct from performance of
fiduciary duties generally.  Under the traditional approach, limited
standing protects the governing function of the board.  As the
Mississippi Supreme Court recently explained in rejecting a suit by
members of the community against the sale of a nonprofit hospital:
To presume standing under these facts and permit the
Intervenors to challenge the business judgment of a
properly elected board of governors of a corporation
would be to say that an indefinite class of plaintiffs, who
simply might receive benefit from acts of a charitable
corporation, should have a legal voice in how the
corporation is to be run, and further permit individuals
from the benefitted public to improperly be deemed
members of non-profit corporations, capable of
instituting derivative suits against the corporate board
of directors and causing the various courts of this state
to dictate to charitable corporate officers how to manage
their charitable corporations.  This result offends the
fundamental tenets of corporate law and the express
intent of our state legislature.99
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100 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5142(a) (West 1990) (adopted in 1980) (granting expanded
standing).
101 See, e.g., id. (permitting any of the following to “bring an action to enjoin, correct, obtain
damages for or to otherwise remedy a breach of a charitable trust”:  (1) the corporation,
derivatively; (2) an officer; (3) a director; (4) a “person with a reversionary, contractual, or
property interest in the assets subject to such charitable trust” [but note, not donors
generally]; and (5) the attorney general, or any person granted relator status by the attorney
general).
102 N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 720(b) (McKinney 2006).
103 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 3.04 (1987), available at http://www.paperg
lyphs.com/nporegulation/documents/model_unpo_corp_act.html.
104 MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT, 3D ED. § 3.04 (Exposure Draft 2006), available at http://
meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/CL580000/sitesofinterest_files/MNCAexposur
edraft.doc.  See generally Lizabeth A. Moody, Revising the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act:
Plus Ça Change, Plus C’est La Même Chose, 41 GA. L. REV. 1335 (2007) (discussing revision
project).
105 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.30(a); MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT, 3D ED.
§ 7.41(a) (Exposure Draft 2006).
106 See supra notes 22–34 and accompanying text (discussing trust law origin of doctrine);
infra notes 196–217 and accompanying text (discussing courts granting such standing).
As against this policy, some states worried that public
enforcement needs to be supplemented by private enforcement.
Accordingly, a few modern statutes grant standing to an expanded
class of private persons to bring a derivative suit against a nonprofit
corporation.100  Included in some state statutes are certain classes of
donors, sometimes under the general category of those with a special
interest.  Usually, the attorney general must be given notice of any
action brought by the other persons specified, and the attorney
general may intervene.101  In one of the more detailed statutes, New
York’s 1970 statutory revision grants standing in suits for breach of
fiduciary duty to the attorney general, the corporation, a director, an
officer, members holding 5% of voting power, and, if the certificate
of incorporation or the bylaws so provide, any contributor of at least
$1,000; the statute also grants standing to a receiver, a trustee in
bankruptcy, or a judgment creditor.102  Both the Revised Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act, adopted by the American Bar Association
in 1987,103 and its recently proposed revision104 specify standing
provisions for ultra vires and derivative suits.105  In both versions of
both sections, private standing is afforded members of the
organization and members of the board; donors as such are not
mentioned.  Even in the absence of a statute, some courts grant
standing to those with a “special interest.”106
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107 Blasko et al., supra note 6, at 49; accord James J. Fishman, The Development of
Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 674 (1985) (urging
that relators, if successful, should be granted reimbursement for costs and attorneys’ fees).
108 Robert Schalkenbach Found. v. Lincoln Found., Inc., 91 P.3d 1019, 1030 n.18 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2004).
109 See supra notes 64–75 and accompanying text (discussing Smithers decision).
110 See S.7805 § 522(c), 1999 Leg., 223d Sess. (N.Y. 2000), available on LEXIS at 1999 Bill
Text NYS.B. 7805 (“If a governing board disregards a restriction imposed by the applicable gift
instrument on the use or investment of an institutional fund, the donor may, on notice to the
Attorney General, apply to the Supreme Court of the judicial district where the corporation
has its office or principal place of carrying out the purposes for which it was formed for an
order to enforce said restriction.”).
111 See William Josephson, Guiding Practitioners and Fiduciaries on Charities, N.Y.L.J.,
Dec. 3, 2001, available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/nylj/nylj3.pdf (mentioning that
“the Attorney General last year proposed amendments to Not-for-Profit Corporation Law
section 522 to clarify the rights of donors” (footnote omitted)).  Josephson was then Assistant
Attorney General-in-Charge of Attorney General Eliot Spitzer’s Charities Bureau.  Omitted
footnote 11 reads:  “S. 7805-A (May 2, 2000), which, in light of the Smithers decision, the
Attorney General did not seek reintroduction of this year.”  Id.  Josephson added:  “If the
Appellate Division’s decision becomes final, the need for such legislation becomes less
pressing.”  Id.
112 Recent Virginia legislation declares that for purposes of attorney general and court
Alternatively, the attorney general may grant “relator” status to
a private person to bring suit on behalf of the state.  While the
relator takes the lead in prosecuting the action and is responsible for
costs, the attorney general retains ultimate control of the action and
may withdraw, dismiss, or compromise it at any time.107  Procedural
restrictions might apply, though.  Recently, an Arizona appellate
court ruled:  “Appellants must also be interested parties to act as
relators to bring an action on behalf of the public.  Since Appellants
are not interested parties to enforce the trust, they are also
precluded from acting as relators.”108
Following the decision in Smithers,109 the New York legislature
considered granting standing to a donor to sue for enforcement of a
gift restriction, but only upon notice to the attorney general.110
Reportedly in light of the settlement in Smithers, though, no change
was made to the statute.111  The legal framework thus leaves courts
to apply the common law trust rules described above to the question
of donor standing.  By contrast, it does not appear that courts will
import standing granted under the trust statutes:  In a recent case
(in which the judge ruled from the bench), plaintiffs failed to
persuade a Virginia probate judge to apply the Uniform Trust Code
to a corporate charity.112  Specifically, plaintiffs were denied
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authority, a charitable corporation is to be treated as a charitable trust.  VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-
507.1 & 17.1-513.01, added by 2002 VA. ACTS ch. 792 (Apr. 8, 2002).  In Dodge v. Trustees of
Randolph-Macon Woman’s College, Cir. Court File No. CL06000894 (Lynchburg Cir. 2007), the
plaintiffs unsuccessfully invoked that legislation in arguing that the Virginia Uniform Trust
Code applies to corporate charities in Virginia.  The court filings and a transcript of the
hearing are posted at the plaintiffs’ website, http://www.preserveeducation alchoice.org.
113 The court, ruling from the bench, declared:
[T]he court system is just not set up to be an overseer for every charitable
hospital and club or function and college in the state of Virginia.  That’s
not the purpose of, I think, either one of these statutes.
I think if there’s an allegation of criminal fraud, misdoing or the
Attorney General wants to be involved, the Attorney General could be
involved.  But I don’t think the Uniform Trust Code is really applicable to
the assets of Randolph-Macon, because it’s not under that code section
required to be in the manner of an expressed trust.
Transcript of Record at 79, Dodge, Cir. Court File No. CL06000894, available at http://www.
preserveeducationalchoice.org/Official%20Transcript%201%2023%2007%20Demurrer%20H
earing%20-%20CT%20Suit.pdf.  Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on February 19, 2007.  On
March 13, 2007, the trial court entered an order sustaining the college’s demurrer and
dismissing the case.  In a cover letter sent to counsel, the court explained that it considered
the plaintiff’s amended complaint, but ruled as follows:
For the reasons stated in the defendant’s Memoranda and oral
argument, the Court makes the following findings and rulings:  The VUTC
is only applicable to trusts created by statute and administered in the
manner of an express trust; § 2.2-507.1 of the Virginia Code grants the
Attorney General standing to address misapplication of charitable trust
assets, but does not eliminate the statutory provisions of the Non-stock
Corporation Act, which governs the actions of the Trustees of RMWC; and
that the defendant has not breached any duties by voting to admit males
to RMWC which has been done in the past.  This vote was a corporate
decision that should not be second-guessed by the courts, students or
donors.  The Court has further ruled that the doctrine of cy pres is not
applicable to the facts as alleged in these pleadings, and even if it was
applicable the plaintiffs lack standing to bring this cause of action.
Order Granting Demurrer, at 2, Dodge, Cir. Court File No. CL06000894, available at http://
www.preserveeducationalchoice.org/03-15-07%20Granting%20Demurrer%20in%20Trust%
20Case%20after%20Amendment.pdf.  The college has changed its name to Randolph College,
effective July 1, 2007.
standing in their bid to have a judge review the decision of the
Randolph-Macon Woman’s College to amend its articles of
incorporation to allow it to admit male students.113  But other
decisions instead apply contract doctrine, which I discuss next.
D. CONTRACT DOCTRINE
1. Contrasting Private Contracts and Restricted Charitable Gifts.
Several recent cases that sympathize with the donor’s right to
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114 Such an approach might carry tax risks.  See John D. Colombo, The Marketing of
Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions Deduction:  Integrating Theories for the
Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 699–700 (2001) (suggesting that
gift instrument that looks too much like bargained-for contract might appropriately jeopardize
donor’s tax deduction for gift).  Professor Colombo states:
Fee schedules, either express or enforced by custom, for spiritual auditing,
mass intentions, tickets to ceremonies, or “commemorative opportunities”
are perfect examples of how the modern charitable organization has
structured transactions like purchases ostensibly to overcome the tendency
of donors not to give at all, or to “lowball” a particular contribution.  In
such cases, we should assume that the “substantial indicia of purchase,”
even if not technically considered a quid pro quo, surrounding the
transaction also overcomes the free-riding tendency of donors and
minimizes market failure for the recipient entity.  The appropriate
response, therefore, is to reduce overall government subsidization of the
entity by denying deductibility to these transactions.
Id.  Compare I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 03-23-006 (Nov. 22, 2002) (holding that value of contractual
stadium naming rights results in impermissible private business use under tax-exempt bond
rules of I.R.C. § 141(b):  “[w]hile the Contract relates only to a narrow set of rights with respect
to the Facility, we do not believe that this precludes a finding of private business use.  If
anything, this impacts the measurement of private business use, not the existence of such
use.”).  But see Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-2(f)(9) (2006), Example 4 (“A, disqualified person with
respect to private foundation S, contributes certain real estate to S for the purpose of building
a neighborhood recreation center in a particular underprivileged area.  As a condition of the
gift, S agrees to name the recreation center after A.  Since the benefit to A is only incidental
and tenuous, the naming of the recreation center, by itself, will not be an act of self-dealing.”).
See also Rev. Rul. 73-407, 1973-2 C.B. 383 (citing example from regulations in holding that
contribution by private foundation to public charity made on condition that public charity
change its name to that of substantial contributor to foundation and agree not to change name
again for 100 years does not constitute act of self-dealing under I.R.C. § 4941(d)(1)(E)).
115 See In re Barnes Found., 672 A.2d 1364, 1366 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (“The matter of
standing is jurisdictional and may not be waived by the court . . . electing to proceed on the
merits.”).
complain about the charity’s breach of the gift restriction have
characterized the appropriate legal regime as contract rather than
property.114  Put this way, why should the donor not be able to
enforce the benefit of his or her bargain—even if the benefit is for
someone else?  Moreover, advisors to donors are becoming more
savvy, explicitly demanding such terms in the gift instrument as the
charitable donee’s waiver of the donor’s lack of standing to sue to
enforce the restriction.  Is the court thereby obligated to hear the
dispute, or is jurisdiction not to be conferred by agreement—should
the donor’s traditional lack of standing not be waivable on public
policy grounds?115
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119 Id. at *6.
Recently, a court applied contract law to allow a reverter suit
even without such a right reserved in the gift instrument.116  In this
case, the appellate court ruled that where a college “promised to
name the wing after appellant in exchange for appellant’s $500,000
donation[,] . . . a cause of action for breach of contract accrued to
appellant when the building was completed and the entire building
named without any mention of appellant.”117  However, because the
donor did not bring suit “within six years after respondent’s breach
of contract,” the court affirmed the district court’s finding “that his
contract claim was time-barred.”118  Dicta made clear that the court
would have enforced the college’s promise, by ordering a repayment
of the gift with other funds:  “Nonprofit corporations, for-profit
corporations, and individuals, are expected to honor their
commitments.  Courts of law and equity enforce legal contracts.  Had
appellant timely sued, no harm would come to Augsburg,
specifically, or society in general, if just debts were paid.  The
keeping of one’s promise honors us all.”119
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120 See Hopkins v. Women’s Med. Coll. of Pa., 200 A. 32, 33 (Pa. 1938) (involving $5,000
endowment to medical college obliging it to provide scholarship); Alumnae Ass’n v. Univ. of
Pa., 159 A. 449, 449 (Pa. 1932) (involving endowment for bed in private hospital room for
association members).  Alumnae Association involved a donation that obligated the recipient
to provide hospital service; the court declared:
Answering that defendant hospital authorities were at liberty to reject the
endowment at the time of the merger of the two hospitals, they did not do
so, but, in terms not in the slightest degree doubtful, accepted the
endowment and have for sixteen years continuously carried out the terms
of the contract without questions.  They cannot now be permitted to
repudiate it.
Alumnae Ass’n, 159 A. at 450.  Hopkins involved a donation to provide full scholarships, but
these could no longer be satisfied from the gift; the court declared:
If conditions subsequently demonstrated the College, in its natural
eagerness to secure substantial contributions, had made an unwise
bargain, that, of course, would not relieve it from performance. . . .  If
respondent’s viewpoint were to be upheld, the raising of the tuition rates
would be permitted to defeat the entire object of petitioners by making
their gift hopelessly inadequate for the purpose for which, in good faith, it
had been contributed.
Hopkins, 200 A. at 34.
121 See infra notes 157–94 and accompanying text.
122 102 N.W.2d 463 (Mich. 1960).
123 Id. at 464.
124 Id. at 465.
125 Id.
126 Id.
Despite occasional similar case law,120 the traditional view is that
a restricted gift is not a contract.  Accordingly, if it becomes
burdensome for the charity to perform the restriction, the court will
modify the restriction under the cy pres doctrine rather than hold
the charity to the benefit of the bargain.121  For example, Knights of
Equity Memorial Scholarships Commission v. University of Detroit122
involved a 1924 donation designed to fund twenty-four full
scholarships into perpetuity.123  The court took judicial notice of “the
shrinkage in the value of the dollar, of the hardships visited upon
the recipients of fixed incomes,” and the necessity that “the suit
must be cut to fit the cloth.”124  For several years, the university
made up the shortfall between the cost of tuition and the income of
the fund out of its other assets, but finally “contended that the
intention of the parties in the agreement was not to impose a
financial burden upon the school.”125  The school also argued “that if
this were to be held an ordinary contract, the doctrine of commercial
frustration would apply to it.”126  The Michigan Supreme Court
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127 Id. at 467.
128 Id.  In so ruling, the court explicitly rejected the reasoning in the two prior
Pennsylvania cases discussed supra in note 120.
129 No. B151776, 2002 WL 31022068 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2002).
130 Id. at *2.
131 Id. at *3.  The court rejected the university’s argument that the oral terms would
necessarily be inadmissible:
Respondents also contend appellant’s allegation that they orally promised
immediately to fund the chair violates the parol evidence rule, which bars
oral revisions that contradict a written contract.  The rule applies,
however, only when the written agreement is integrated, which is a
found:  “The circumstances surrounding the transaction and the
expressed intent of the parties, as well as the time of agreement
itself, reject any conclusion that this was purely a contract or that it
should be so construed.”127  In affirming the decision of the
chancellor that the scholarships should function only as a credit
against tuition, the court commented, “should such inflexibility in
the use of trust funds become the rule, a curtailment of the facilities
otherwise available to all must be the inevitable result.  It is to this
situation that the cy pres doctrine has particular applicability.”128
In a recent unpublished California appeals court decision, Glenn
v. University of Southern California,129 the parties—and the
court—assumed that if the transaction were a gift, the donor would
not have standing to sue to enforce its terms, but if the transaction
were a contract, the donor would have standing under ordinary
contract doctrine.130  The appellate court, reversing the trial court,
held that the donor is entitled to a trial on his claims of breach of
contract:
Appellant alleges he had a partly-oral, partly-written
contract with U.S.C. to endow a professorial chair which
U.S.C. promised to fund while it waited for him to honor
his pledge.  He alleges he performed under the contract
when he transferred $1.6 million to U.S.C.  He alleges
U.S.C. breached the contract by not funding the
professorship and by selecting an ineligible recipient.
Finally, he alleges U.S.C.’s breach damaged him because
he could have put his money to uses other than giving it
to U.S.C.  Based on these allegations, appellant has
pleaded a cause of action for breach of contract.131
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question of the parties’ intent, which is itself a factual question.
Id. at *4.
132 Id. at *3.  Finally, the court allowed Glenn to proceed with his claims of common law
and statutory misappropriation:
Appellant alleges respondents publicized his endowment of the
professorship to encourage donations from other philanthropists.  He
further alleges that he permitted respondents to use his name only on the
condition of their complying with the terms of the endowment, but they
exceeded the scope of his consent when they breached their agreement.
Their breach injured him, he alleges, because it denied him the use of his
funds and besmirched his name in the philanthropic community.
Id. at *4.
133 Greg Winter & Jonathan Cheng, Strings Attached:  Givers and Colleges Clash on
Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2004, at A1.
134 See Stephen G. Greene, Seeking Control in Court, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Wash., D.C.),
Nov. 28, 2002, at 6 (reporting on recent cases).
135 See Robin Pogrebin, Avery Fisher Hall Forever, Heirs Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2002,
at E1 (describing threat of legal action by Fisher family); Robin Pogrebin, Philharmonic to Give
Home a New Interior, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at A1 (“At one point the Philharmonic
considered tearing down the entire building and starting over from scratch, a plan that was
largely rejected as too costly, time-consuming and full of other problems given that the Avery
Fisher family threatened legal action if the hall’s name was changed.  An internal renovation
allows the orchestra to offer the auditorium as a naming opportunity for a large donor, an
enticement generally considered essential for such an ambitious fund-raising effort.”).  See
generally John K. Eason, Private Motive and Perpetual Conditions in Charitable Naming Gifts:
When Good Names Go Bad, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 375 (2005) (exploring problems that result
from charitable naming opportunity contribution).
The appeals court also permitted the donor to prosecute his claim of
promissory fraud:  “Appellant alleges respondents promised to fund
the professorship immediately without intending to do so.  He
alleges respondents made the promise to encourage him to endow
the position, and in giving $1.6 million to U.S.C. he justifiably relied
on that promise.”132  The Glenn case reportedly settled, but the terms
were not disclosed.133
It is unclear whether the recent increased invocation of contract
doctrine by donors (or their heirs or representatives) is merely
accidental or represents a trend.134  We can assume, though, that the
growing number of reported cases is just the tip of the iceberg:  after
all, a matter need not reach court to achieve satisfaction for the
donor.  For example, as reported in the press, Lincoln Center likely
forestalled a lawsuit from the family of Avery Fisher by scaling back
plans to replace Avery Fisher Hall, and so avoided having to change
the Hall’s name to acknowledge the generosity of a new donor.135  In
reviewing concluded and pending cases brought by donors, the New
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136 Stephanie Strom, Donors Add Watchdog Role to Relations with Charities, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 2003, at A8.  The story quotes Janet P. Atkins, chief executive of Philanthropic
Advisers, a consulting firm:  “We have constructed some really hairy gift agreements
recently. . . .  Donors are asking for serious accountability and spelling their terms out in great
detail.”  Id.
137 See Gaubatz, supra note 47, at 922–23 (citing a few cases allowing grantor standing
from nineteenth and early twentieth centuries); John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis
of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 627, 631 (1995) (finding that “the deal between settlor
and trustee is functionally indistinguishable from the modern third-party-beneficiary
contract,” but excluding from his study charitable trusts, as “quasi-public institutions that
must satisfy standards of public benefit”).
138 Chester, supra note 87, at 634.
139 Id.
140 698 N.W.2d 900 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
141 Id. at 906.
York Times observed that donors’ recent “muscle philanthropy” will
“almost certainly increase the institutions’ costs, not only to defend
themselves but also to improve internal financial controls.”136
From the academic direction, too, commentators subject the topic
of settlor standing to contract analysis.137  While the pioneering
articles focused on private trusts, Professor Ronald Chester was
inspired by the Uniform Trust Code to address charitable trusts.138
When the gift constitutes a contract, he would allow the grantor (or
successors-in-interest, such as the grantor’s estate, but not the
grantor’s heirs) to sue for compliance with the restricted use, “or if
specific performance is impracticable because of misappropriation of
all or part of the gift, the grantor can sue for damages to restore the
gift to its appropriate size.”139 
Despite these recent developments, courts still commonly hew to
the traditional approach that a donor cannot maintain a suit to
enforce a gift restriction and that a restricted gift is not subject to
traditional contract analysis.  See, for example, the Michigan
appellate court decision in Prentis Family Foundation v. Barbara
Ann Karmanos Cancer Institute,140 in which the plaintiff complained
that the donee had failed to maintain the donor family’s name on its
cancer center following a merger.141  Reversing the trial court, the
appellate court ruled that the donor’s family lacked standing to bring
the suit:  “Here, the language of the endowment agreement indicated
that the funds were donated for a charitable purpose.  The attorney
2007] CHARITABLE-DONOR STANDING 1229
142 Id. at 913–14 (citing St. John’s-St Luke Evangelical Church v. Nat’l Bank of Detroit, 283
N.W.2d 852 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979), which in turn cites RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §
391).
143 Id. at 915 (footnote omitted).
144 David Barkholz, Karmanos Institute Name Disputed; Cancer Center Should Bear Prentis
Moniker, Heirs Say, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS., Aug. 21, 2000, at 3.
145 Prentis, 698 N.W.2d at 913.
general, a co-trustee, or a person with a special interest may enforce
the terms of a charitable trust, but not the settlor or his heirs.”142
The Michigan appellate court also reversed the finding that
consideration existed for the naming provision:
Here, rather than employing the words “in consideration
for” or a similar term indicating that the payment of the
$1.5 million was in exchange for the naming provision,
the parties used “[in] recognition of and appreciation
to. . . .”  The use of these terms did not indicate a
bargained for exchange with respect to the naming
provision.143
Regrettably, though, this analysis implies that the distinction
between gift and contract is easily made by the choice of the right
magic words.  Separately, the press had reported that the donor’s
family—which had a representative on the board—waited five years
to make its unhappiness known,144 suggesting that laches might
have been a better legal basis for the court’s decision.  Importantly,
moreover, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s rejection of
the plaintiff’s claim for damages:
[T]he trial court noted that plaintiff had not cited any
authority with respect to the value of the loss of naming
rights by a family charitable foundation, found that
there was no method to measure damages, and
concluded that plaintiff’s damages were too speculative.
Indeed, plaintiff has not cited any authority to support
its claim for damages on appeal.145
As described above, suits by a current or prospective beneficiary
are also amenable to contract analysis (although it is still not easy
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146 See infra notes 228–50 and accompanying text (discussing the Hershey School Alumni
Association).
147 Pledges have been upheld under standard contract doctrine, even if courts have
sometimes stretched to find consideration.  See Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l Chautauqua County
Bank, 159 N.E. 173, 176 (N.Y. 1927) (noting that “[t]he longing for posthumous remembrance
is an emotion not so weak as to justify us in saying that its gratification is a negligible good”).
148 See generally Mary Frances Butig, Gordon T. Butler & Lynne M. Murphy, Pledges to
Nonprofit Organizations:  Are They Enforceable and Must They Be Enforced?, 27 U.S.F. L. REV.
47 (1992).
149 See Alan G. Artner, Museum Settles Suit over Reneged Pledge, CHI. TRIB., July 10, 1998,
at 1 (discussing suit over defaulted pledge).  In 1991, Paul W. Oliver-Hoffmann made a $5
million pledge to Chicago’s Museum of Contemporary Art (MCA), to kick off its fund raising
campaign for its new building on Chicago Avenue, near the Water Tower.  Id.  At the time,
Paul served as chairman of the museum’s board of trustees.  Id.  During the next seven years,
he and his wife, Camille, continued to support museum efforts, but in 1992 they moved to
Virginia, and Paul resigned from the MCA board.  Id.  In their new home, they became active
with the Hirschhorn Museum in Washington, D.C., whose board Camille joined in 1998.  Id.
Paul never fulfilled his pledge to the MCA, based on his view that its management was fiscally
imprudent.  Id.  The suit ended in settlement.  Id.  In another dispute, a Texas jury was not
sympathetic to a suit by a Pennsylvania college that in 1976 cajoled a major alumnus into
to win such a claim).  By contrast, contract analysis would not be so
easy to apply in a suit by those other than donors and beneficiaries
who purport to guard the guardians.146  Additionally, most important
to our immediate topic, treating a testamentary restricted bequest
that was drafted without the knowledge or consent of the charitable
donee as an “offer” and the taking of the restricted gift as
“acceptance” that provides “consideration” resulting in a contract
usurps gift law from its clearest application.
2. Symmetry for Applying Contract Law?:  Charitable Pledges.
Application of contract doctrine to charitable gifts finds perhaps its
strongest support in the opposite situation:  when donors fail to
perform as promised.  Under traditional contract law, in the
ordinary case, the charity has provided no reciprocal “consideration”
to the donor.147  Nevertheless, courts in most states will enforce a
pledge or installment gift if the charity has relied on the donor’s
promise to its detriment or if the promise induced others to give.148
(This assumes that none of the other contract defenses apply, such
as the donor’s lack of mental capacity to make the gift, or the
charity’s fraud, undue influence, or duress.)  Charities seem to be
increasing their willingness to sue donors who default on their major
pledges—often when the donor dies and the will makes no mention
of the promise.149
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pledging $4 million and continued to court him over the next two decades, seeking as much as
$50 million.  See Daniel Golden, College Finally Got Alumnus to Pledge; Next Job:  Collecting,
WALL ST. J., July 24, 2003, at A1 (discussing suit).  The donor had given only $2 million by the
time he died in 1995, prompting the college to sue to collect another $5 million.  Id. (“The case
affords a rare look at the lengths to which a financially strapped college went to secure big
gifts.  Interviews and memos filed in a school lawsuit against [J. Howard Marshall II’s] estate
show that both Haverford and Mr. Marshall were less than candid with each other.  Together,
they created a cautionary tale for colleges about the hazards of pinning their hopes on
reluctant angels.”).  Specifically, the jury found “that Haverford hadn’t been injured because
it hadn’t relied on Mr. Marshall’s pledges but instead had named already-funded projects after
him.”  Id.  In an interview, the jury foreman said he “didn’t like the fact that Haverford kept
an extensive file on Mr. Marshall, including details of his and his then-wife’s drinking habits,
confidential financial information and health.”  Id.
150 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1979).
151 Id. § 90(2).
152 But see, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85
CAL. L. REV. 821, 861 n.107 (1997) (“Assuming that charitable subscriptions are enforceable
on the basis of public policy, rather than on the basis of actual reliance, then based on the
principle that the measure of damages for breach of a given kind of promise should be based
on the reason that the promise is enforceable, such promises should be enforceable to their full
extent, rather than simply to the extent of any reliance.”).
153 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 480, reporter’s note 4 (Preliminary Draft
No. 3, 2005).
Section 90(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts enforces
promises generally in cases of detrimental reliance, but only to the
extent justice requires.150  By contrast, Section 90(2) provides for full
enforcement of charitable subscriptions without any additional
showing of reliance or induced action.151  However, the charity’s
recovery is still limited to what justice requires—e.g., to the extent
of its detriment, or to the extent a mutual promise was performed.152
ALI Preliminary Draft No. 3 does not, however, adopt the position
of Section 90(2) of the Second Restatement.  As a threshold matter of
terminology, not all pledge instruments are the same.  In contrast to
an instrument that declares the donor’s intent to create a legally
binding obligation, some pledges explicitly state that they will not
result in a binding obligation.  In such a case, the charity cannot be
considered to have relied on the donor’s promise.  On the merits,
while the position enunciated in Section 90(2) may be the more
enlightened view as de facto recognition of courts’ creative efforts to
find such promises binding, it remains a minority view.153  As the
Reporter for the Second Restatement observed a few years ago:  “The
exception for charitable subscriptions has played to mixed reviews.
Courts have been less than pellucid in assessing such important
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154 E. Allan Farnsworth, Promises and Paternalism, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385, 404–05
(2000) (footnotes omitted).  Professor Farnsworth identified a few dangers that attend
enforcing promises to make charitable gifts, including the fact that, “[i]n contrast to the law
during the heyday of the seal, the rule for charitable subscriptions does not require a formality
to serve a cautionary function.”  Id. at 404.  As a result, a promisor could more easily
“squander his future even though “he had not so much as a penny.”  Id. at 398.  While the law
recognizes a solution to this problem in the form of a self-declared trust without requiring
delivery or anything in writing, such a trust might be revocable and is limited to property
owned by the donor at the time of its declaration.  Id. at 399–400.  Farnsworth suggests that
“it behooves one who makes . . . a promise [to make a gift] to fashion explicit provisions that
take account of the possibility of regret.”  Id. at 406.  Even then, a difficult situation may arise
where “the promisee has at least some responsibility for the promisor’s regret,” for example,
where the promisor “is shocked at inefficient food distribution by [the] chosen charity.”  Id. at
408.  And finally, there remains the question of whether “the law [should] ignore even a
devastating reversal of fortune.”  Id. at 407.  In sum, “[i]t seems safe to hypothesize that the
less tolerant a legal system is in excusing promisors from their promises, the more hesitant
courts would be in finding promises to be binding.”  Id. at 405.
155 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6 (West 1997).  Professor Farnsworth characterized the law’s general
refusal to enforce a promise to make a gift as paternalistic intervention lacking justification.
Farnsworth, supra note 154, at 386–87.  At the same time, harkening back to the era when a
promise made under seal was binding, he would require some type of formality.  Id. at 409; see
also id. at 392 (“Because every promise involves an expression of an intention to make a
commitment, courts used the formality of the seal to distinguish those promises that were
binding under the intention principle from those that were not.”).  He suggests a “similar
formality,” such as one recommended by a Canadian commission:  “enactment of a statute
providing that a witnessed, signed writing take the place of the seal.”  Id. at 409.
156 In re Wirth, 789 N.Y.S.2d 69 (App. Div. 2005).  The agreement declared that the
signatory, who “intended to be legally bound,” “irrevocably pledged and promised to pay”
$150,000.
factors as whether the promise was written or oral and whether the
promisor reneged before death or simply died.  Scholarly efforts to
justify the exception have been varied.”154
As an alternative approach, Pennsylvania adopted the Uniform
Written Obligations Act, which provides:  “A written release or
promise, hereafter made and signed by the person releasing or
promising, shall not be invalid or unenforceable for lack of
consideration, if the writing also contains an additional express
statement, in any form of language, that the signer intends to be
legally bound.”155  In a three-to-two vote, a New York appeals court
recently upheld the application of this statute to a pledge agreement
executed two months before the promisor’s death in favor of Drexel
University.156
III.  DISTINGUISHING IMPLEMENTATION, BREACH, AND CY PRES
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157 See, e.g., Ass’n of Fundraising Prof’ls, Emerging Issue:  How Much Donor Involvement
Is Too Much?, http://www.afpnet.org (follow “Ethics” hyperlink; then follow “Emerging Issues”
hyperlink; then follow “Emerging issue: How much donor involvement is too much?” hyperlink)
(last visited June 25, 2007) (describing how restrictions might violate a nonprofit’s mission
statement or conflicts-of-interest policy, as well as public-benefit legal requirements).  Several
professional associations have promulgated codes of ethics or standards of practice that deal
with restricted gifts.  See, e.g., Am. Ass’n of Museums, Guidelines for Museums on Developing
and Managing Individual Donor Support (Nov. 21, 2002), http://www.aam-
us.org/museumresources/ethics/indiv_support.cfm (offering restricted gifts guidelines).
158 See, e.g., University of Vermont, Gifts (Nov. 27, 2006), http://www.uvm.edu/~uvmppg/
ppg/advance/gifts.pdf (containing university’s policy).  For a checklist of questions from a legal
practitioner’s perspective, see Simpson Thacher & Bartlett’s “Decision Points for Drafting a
Grant Agreement Between a Donor and a Charitable Gift Recipient” (July 2, 2002) (on file with
author).  For additional recommendations, see Eugene R. Tempel, Donor Intent:  Principles of
Documenting a Gift, NONPROFIT TIMES, Feb. 1, 2003, at 30.
159 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 87 (2007) (“When a trustee has discretion with
respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is subject to supervision by a court only to
prevent abuse of discretion.”); see also supra note 34 (quoting from Robert Schalkenbach
Foundation regarding risk of vexation litigation).
160 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 87 cmt. b.
Gift restrictions will eventually lead to problems down the
road—the tighter the restriction, the sooner the problem.  Charities
themselves are to some extent responsible for this result.
Philanthropic institutions are under constant pressures to obtain
funds and to yield to donor demands in doing so, but charities have
the obligation to accept restrictions carefully.157  It might be prudent
for a charity to adopt a “gift acceptance policy” calling for board
approval before major restricted gifts can be accepted.158 
A. IMPLEMENTATION VERSUS BREACH
As a threshold matter, in carrying out the requirements of a
restricted gift, the charity will often have to exercise its judgment.
Courts minimize the risk of vexatious litigation by refusing to
second-guess decisions committed to the discretion of the trustee or
governing board.159  As described in comments to the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts:  “A court will not interfere with a trustee’s exercise
of a discretionary power (or decision not to exercise the power) when
that exercise is reasonable, not based on an improper interpretation
of the terms of the trust, and not otherwise inconsistent with the
trustee’s fiduciary duties . . . .”160  The same approach will apply in
the ALI principles project.
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161 Legally, the Foundation is a nonstock corporation, incorporated in Delaware, that is
classified as a supporting organization (and thus a non-private foundation) under § 509(a)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code.
162 See generally E. Daniel Larkin, Don’t Turn a Donor into a Plaintiff, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), May 27, 2005, at B18.
163 Winter & Cheng, supra note 133, at A12.  “ ‘Our parents have been betrayed,’ said Bill
Robertson, the 55-year-old son of Charles and Marie.  ‘Really, the university has almost
swindled these wonderful people who did something wonderful for this country.  It’s almost
a matter of good and evil.’ ”  Id.  In response, Princeton reportedly filed a motion asking the
court to order that Princeton University is the only permitted beneficiary of the Robertson
Foundation—invoking the private letter ruling that the fund received from the Internal
The most spectacular recent litigation over donor intent, still
awaiting trial, puts in jeopardy the $650 million endowment that
provides funding for the Woodrow Wilson School of International
and Public Affairs at Princeton University.  Legal maneuvering has
already cost both sides many millions of dollars.  The donors,
Charles and Marie Robertson, now dead, had funded the Robertson
Foundation in 1961 with a $35 million gift; the Foundation, in turn,
devotes its income to supporting the Woodrow Wilson School for the
purposes specified by the donors.161  The plaintiffs include the non-
Princeton-appointed members of the Foundation’s board (these
“family trustees” are elected by a majority of the descendants of the
donors) and two non-director children of the donors.  They filed their
suit in 2002 against Princeton University and the four university-
appointed members of the Foundation’s board.162  The plaintiffs
complain that, contrary to the founders’ intent, the school’s
graduates are seeking employment with non-governmental
organizations instead of in government foreign service and
international relations.  Princeton counters that the field of foreign
affairs has changed and expanded over the last fifty years.  The suit
also alleges that the Foundation’s university-appointed board
members improperly chose to delegate investment responsibility to
PRINCO, Princeton’s office that manages its endowment.  Without
seeking to modify the Foundation’s charitable purpose, the plaintiffs
want to convert the Foundation to a private foundation whose
trustees are appointed by the family.  In 2004, the Robertson family
amended its complaint to allege fraud, “introducing the prospect of
punitive damages to a lawsuit that is already the colossus of its
kind, one in which the scale of the money involved is rivaled only by
the bitterness it has inspired.”163
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Revenue Service granting it supporting organization status.  Chanakya Sethi, University Files
New Claims in Suit, DAILY PRINCETONIAN, Feb. 3, 2005, available at http://www.dailyprince
tonian.com/archives/2005/02/03/news/11887.shtml (reporting that family’s attorney responded:
“ ‘[The Foundation’s] certificate of incorporation allows the University to appoint four of seven
trustees.  Not seven of seven.  And I also understand that the university has a fiduciary and
moral duty to use the money in the way it was intended.  Nothing that [former University
president] Dr. Goheen says here supports the notion that the University’s actions are beyond
judicial review.’ ”).
164 Robertson v. Princeton Univ., Civ. Action No. C-99-02 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div., June 20,
2003) (opinion of Neil H. Shuster) (on file with author).
165 Id. at 25–26 (citing City of Paterson v. Paterson Gen. Hosp., 235 A.2d 487, 495 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) (discussing standing)); see also infra notes 209–11 and accompanying
text (discussing Paterson).
166 The court complained that “[a]ttempting to decipher which alleged wrongs are pled with
respect to the derivative claims, as opposed to the direct claims, is a formidable task due to the
style of the pleading.”  Robertson, Civ. Action No. C-99-02, at 26.
In 2003, the trial judge denied Princeton’s motion to dismiss on
grounds of plaintiffs’ lack of standing.164  The court adopted a liberal
approach with regard to corporate charities:
The threshold for standing in cases involving charitable
corporations is very low.  Where accountability for the
acts of charitable corporations may be subject to limited
oversight, and where the State, through the office of the
Attorney General does not have the resources to provide
extensive supervision, there is a strong public interest in
allowing standing for individuals to bring these kinds of
suits that should not be frustrated by stringent
requirements.165
The court then divided the claims into two groups:  direct claims
brought by the donors’ descendants and derivative claims brought by
board members.166  As to the first group, it held:
The by-laws of the Foundation state that the Family
Trustees will be designated by the majority of the
Robertson’s descendants.  Robertson, Ernst and Meier
are entitled to have a vote in appointing who is
designated a Family Trustee and in light of the fact that
courts have taken a liberal approach to standing when it
comes to charitable trusts the court finds that they hold
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167 Id. at 25–26.
168 Id. at 26.  The court applied the law of Delaware, the state of the Foundation’s
incorporation.
169 See, e.g., MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT, 3D ED. § 7.41(b) (Exposure Draft 2006) (“The
plaintiff in a derivative proceeding must be a member, director, or member of a designated
body at the time of bringing the proceeding.”).
170 Laura B. Chisolm, Professor, Case Western Reserve Univ. Law Sch., Oral Comments
at the Annual Conference of the National Center on Philanthropy and the Law (NCPL), New
York Univ. Sch. of Law (Oct. 27–28, 2005).
a “special interest,” separate and distinct from the
beneficiaries of the trust, in seeing that it is enforced.
Therefore, the court holds that Robertson, Ernst and
Meier have standing to bring their direct claims.167
As to the second group, the court limited the standing of board
members to those acts which occurred after that person joined the
board, analogizing the board member to shareholders, who are
required by statute to have an ownership interest at the time of the
wrong as a prerequisite to standing to bring a derivative suit.168
While it is understandable that the Robertson court tried to find a
statutory basis for its rulings regarding enforcement of corporate
fiduciary duties, the better view seems to be that those who are
members of the board of directors—regardless of when the
wrongdoing occurred—should have standing to bring derivative suit
(assuming all other requirements are met).169  More fundamentally,
Professor Laura Chisolm has expressed the concern that, because
the gift was to the Robertson Foundation, the family’s standing
should at most extend to a derivative suit against the Foundation,
but not allow them to bring suit against Princeton University
directly.170
B. “SAVING” DONOR INTENT THROUGH DEVIATION AND CY PRES
To deal with unanticipated circumstances, the law protects
charitable trusts by the equitable saving devices of deviation and cy
pres.  These venerable doctrines allow courts to modify restrictions
that can no longer be carried out or that impede the purposes of the
trust; courts apply similar principles to restricted gifts made to
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171 If the restriction relates to the donor’s charitable purpose, the courts apply the doctrine
of cy pres:  When the restriction becomes impossible, impracticable, or unlawful to carry out,
the court—purporting to determine what the settlor would have wanted had he or she known
of the unanticipated circumstance at the outset—chooses a new purpose.  Traditionally, the
court would depart as minimally as possible from the original charitable purpose—the law
French term was “cy pres comme possible.”  By contrast, when the restriction is merely
administrative, the courts apply the more flexible trust doctrine of equitable deviation.
Although the trend is not universal, recent years have brought a broadening of the
circumstances under which these doctrines are applied and, for cy pres, a liberalization of how
close the new purpose may differ from the original.  See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NONPROFIT ORGS. § 440 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005) (showing liberalization trend).
172 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b (2003).  As described in commentary
to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts:
A trust provision expressing the settlor’s own choice of an alternative
charitable purpose will be carried out, without need to apply the cy pres
doctrine, assuming not only that the initially specified purpose cannot be
given effect or continued but also that the alternative purpose is one that
properly can be given effect.
Id.
173 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. §§ 405, 410, 4A.1 (Preliminary Draft
No. 3, 2005) (describing advisability of anticipating need for change in gift instrument).
Because restrictions can arise from a charity’s solicitation, the solicitation material or
memorandum of acceptance should contain similar provisions.  Id.
174 In contrast to gifts made by individuals, a grant by another charitable institution, such
corporate charities.171  If the gift instrument specifies what should
be done, the donor’s expressed desires will govern.172  A charity that
accepts a restricted gift should work with the prospective donor to
include terms in the gift instrument that set forth clearly the scope
of a restriction and the donor’s desires for altering the restriction to
adapt to unanticipated circumstances and the passage of time.173  A
charity should refuse to accept any gift carrying a restriction that
cannot be released or modified if, in the determination of the charity,
the restriction would conflict with its charitable mission or
operations.  Of course, surprises can always occur, and cy pres or
deviation relief might save a restricted bequest or devise that the
charity received without advance knowledge; otherwise, the charity
must choose between accepting the restrictions or disclaiming the
bequest.
A cy pres proceeding traditionally was not available if the donor
did not intend that the gift be irrevocable.  Most clearly, if the donor
had retained the possibility of a reverter, the donor or her successors
could bring a direct action to sue for the gift back once the intended
charitable purpose failed.174  Moreover, under the common law, even
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as a family foundation, might more readily contain a reverter.  See supra notes 82–84
(discussing Herzog Foundation case).  Indeed, federal tax law assumes that a granting private
foundation, in exercising its “expenditure responsibility,” has the right to sue to recover the
grant in the event of the donee’s breach.  Id.
175 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67.
Just as it is against the policy of the trust law to permit wasteful or
seriously inefficient use of resources dedicated to charity, trust law also
favors an interpretation that would sustain a charitable trust and avoid
the return of the trust property to the settlor or successors in interest.  See
§ 28, Comment a.  Accordingly, when the particular purpose of a charitable
trust fails, in whole or in part, the rule of this Section makes the cy pres
power applicable (thus presuming the existence of what is often called a
general charitable purpose) unless the terms of the trust (defined in § 4)
express a contrary intention.
Id. § 67 cmt. b.
176 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(b) (2000).  One commentator observes:
Apparently, the drafters have left to local law the case of when a gift over
is charitable, no matter how many years have elapsed since trust creation.
An attempt in earlier drafts of the UTC to deal with the effect on cy pres
of a charitable gift over was stricken in the final draft.
Ronald Chester, Modification and Termination of Trusts in the 21st Century:  The Uniform
Trust Code Leads a Quiet Revolution, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 697, 708 (2001) (footnote
omitted).
in the absence of a reverter clause, the donor (or the donor’s
successors-in-interest) can recover the property where:  (1) the
restriction cannot be carried out; (2) the law of the state requires the
donor to have a “general charitable intent”; and (3) the donor did not
have such a general charitable intent.  The Restatement (Third) of
Trusts reverses this approach to reduce the likelihood that
charitable gifts will return to private hands:  Section 67 makes cy
pres available “[u]nless the terms of the trust provide otherwise.”175
Compare Uniform Trust Code Section 413, which eliminates the
prerequisite of general charitable intent and provides that a
provision in the trust “that would result in distribution of the trust
property to a noncharitable beneficiary [will trump cy pres]. . . only
if . . . fewer than 21 years have elapsed since the date of the trust’s
creation.”176  Separately, as discussed in Part V of this Article, the
presence of a “gift over” to an alternative beneficiary traditionally
defeats a finding of general charitable intent, and thus preempts cy
pres; the alternative beneficiary has standing to sue for the gift
because of its direct, adverse interest in the property.
The right of private parties to initiate a cy pres proceeding is
traditionally limited.  After all, a restricted gift is a completed
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177 Contrast the statutory approach in the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act
and the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act.  Compare UNIF. MGMT. OF
INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 7(a), 7A U.L.A. 35 (1972) (permitting donor to consent to release
restriction at request of charity), with UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT §
6(a) (2006), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/1011/ulc/umoifa/2006final_ act.htm
(permitting donor to consent to a release or modification).
178 Austin Wakeman Scott, Education and the Dead Hand, 34 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (1920).
179 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. d, notes (2003).  With regard to the
participation of parties other than the attorney general, trustees or those with a special
interest, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts comments state:  “It is within the discretion of the
court whether to permit . . . [third party] intervention.  The question frequently arises
where . . . a charitable institution seeks to have the trust fund awarded to it.”  Id. (quoting 4A
SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 24, § 399); see, e.g., Sister Elizabeth Kenny Found., Inc. v. Nat’l
Found., 126 N.W.2d 640, 646 (Minn. 1964) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying application to intervene of charity that hoped to receive property in cy pres
proceeding).
180 FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING, supra note 6, at 333.  Fremont-Smith adds:
Another factor influencing the court to grant standing, present in the New
Jersey cases and those in a few other jurisdictions, has been that the
question before the court was an interpretation of the terms of a trust or
a complaint for cy pres or deviation, cases that did not involve allegations
that reflected negatively on the fiduciaries.
Id.
transaction; under the common law, a donor who suffers a change of
heart may not later alter the terms of a gift.177  As Austin Wakeman
Scott noted, the conditions imposed at the time of the gift “are to be
treated like the laws of the Medes and the Persians”—“at stake in
modifying the terms of a trust is not only the wishes of an individual
donor, but the wishes that the law has previously agreed to
honor.”178  The donor (or successor-in-interest) can participate in a
cy pres proceeding in order to avert a reversionary interest in the
property.179  Of course, as described in Part II.C.2, above, in states
that have adopted the Uniform Trust Code, the donor may
commence a cy pres proceeding.  As for others permitted by the court
to participate, Marion Fremont-Smith found that it can be
significant whether the dispute is over the liquidation of the charity
and the final disposition of charitable assets, in which case some
courts want to hear from potential beneficiaries.180
C. “SELF-HELP” MODIFICATION:  PERMITTED, BREACH, OR RATIFICATION?
When a charity applies to court for modification of the restriction
under the doctrines of deviation or cy pres, it is not thereby
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181 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 460 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005).  I
explain in comments:
Under the Restatement of Trusts, if the trustee is called to account, the
court may ratify the breach and no liability on the trustees will result.
However, there is a difference between what the charity (trust or
corporation) is obligated to do, and the potential liability of its fiduciaries.
This Section extends the trust ratification concept to charities as entities,
committing a breach of the restriction.  But what if the charity does
not go to court before unilaterally altering the use of the restricted
gift?  This could occur because the charity cannot adhere to a gift
restriction but fails to file for cy pres or deviation relief.
Alternatively, such relief might not be available but the charity acts
anyway to apply the restricted assets to purposes different from
those specified by the donor, or in deviating from other requirements
(such as investment restrictions).  The latter type of action, if
material, clearly constitutes a breach by the charity of the
restriction, but when does the former?
The ALI draft explores the route of ratification for an
unauthorized departure from the gift restriction.181  Comments in
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but does not address the separate issue of possible breach of fiduciary duty.
Id. § 460 cmt. a.
182 Id. § 460 cmt. b.  Returning the gift to the donor is a doubly troubling remedy, because
a “do-over” deprives the charity of the funds while otherwise freeing it of the consequences of
any wrongdoing.  Indeed, whether a charity that breaches a restriction can simply return the
gift consistent with its fiduciary duties is a matter of debate.  In many cases where the press
reports that the gift was “returned,” it transpires that the gift was actually made to another
charity of the donor’s choice (or if the donor itself was a charity, back to that entity).
As a tax matter, a return of the gift results in income equal to the amount deducted in
the year of the gift.  See Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 39, 402–03 (Ct.
Cl. 1967) (finding charitable donations to be taxable on basis of tax code at time of recoupment
of property, not at time of original deduction).  Income tax consequences are not an issue in
a case where the donor is itself a charity or is a taxpayer whose contributions exceeded the
percentage-of-income annual limits of I.R.C. § 170.  Rather, as Lorraine Sciarra commented
at the October 2005 NCPL conference, in the latter case the concern is avoidance of gift tax,
which is imposed on private, but not charitable, gifts.
183 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 460 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005).
Drawing on news reports of David Mugar’s gift to Boston University, I supply the following
example:
1.  Twenty years after Mr. and Ms. M donated funds to construct a
library at B University, their son D donated $3 million to renovate the M
Memorial Library.  Five years pass, with no such renovation activity
occurring.  B University discovers that the gift had inadvertently been
added to its general funds, whereupon D demands that B University
transfer $3 million plus interest to other charities on whose boards D sits.
B University and D agree to make this transfer of the original $3 million,
thereby remedying the breach.  [Is this the right answer?]
See, e.g., Patrick Healy, Mugar Threatens BU with Suit on ‘Lost’ $3M, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 11,
2002, at A1 (reporting on Mugar’s threatened suit against Boston University unless money
charitably given to Boston University is either returned or used to renovate Mugar Memorial
Library); Patrick Healy, BU Agrees to Give $3M from Mugar to Charities, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
18, 2002, at A1 (reporting that Boston University agreed to transfer to other charities of
Mugar’s choosing); see also Goldie Blumenstyk, Bad Chemistry:  Scientist Sues Florida State
Preliminary Draft No. 3 suggest that ratification generally requires
“correction” and that ratification may be conditioned on the
application of one or more of the following remedies:  return of the
property to the donor, specific performance, injunction, restoration
of funds for the restricted purpose, an accounting, modification of the
restriction, and transfer to another charity subject to the same (or
modified) restriction.182  The draft ALI comments express my
uncertainty about who should be permitted to ratify the charity’s
breach:  “[Do we want to require a charity’s correction of the breach
to be approved by the donor, the alternative beneficiary pursuant to
a gift over, the attorney general, or the court, and condition
ratification on satisfying one or more remedies described in
§ 460(b)?]”183
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U., Saying It Reneged on Gift Deal, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Nov. 18, 2005, at A33
(reporting on university professor suing Florida State for reneging on agreement to build
laboratory from donated funds); Goldie Blumenstyk, FSU Moves to Return Gift for Building,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 27, 2006, at A29 (“[T]he university abruptly
announced that it was returning $11 million.”).
184 See supra notes 65–86 and accompanying text.
185 Id.
186 Tenn. Div. of United Daughters of the Confederacy v. Vanderbilt Univ., 174 S.W.3d 98,
104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
It can be difficult to draw the line between good faith
implementation of the restriction, committed to the charity’s
discretion, and either breach of the restriction or the need for the
charity to seek judicial modification (deviation or cy pres) of the
restriction.  For example, Smithers could be viewed as a case where
the charity (and the attorney general, who, until a change of
administration, agreed with the charity) might have been wise to get
court approval of the change in use of the gift; Herzog Foundation,
similarly, called out for a modification declaration.184  The Robertson
family’s complaint about Princeton’s performance might go the same
route.  All of these situations looked like a breach to the plaintiffs.185
But even going to court might not produce the result the charity
desires.  See, for example, the May 2005 decision by a Tennessee
appeals court involving a seventy-year-old gift that was used to
construct a dormitory; the gift was made on condition that the
building bear the name “Confederate Memorial Hall.”186  To the
dismay of the university, the appellate body reversed the trial court.
As described by the appeals court:
The trial court . . . addressed whether changes in society
would excuse Vanderbilt from continuing to comply with
the contractual naming obligation.  The court noted that
in the years between the signing of the contracts and the
present, racial segregation had been declared
unconstitutional, racial discrimination had been
outlawed, Vanderbilt had integrated its student body,
and a stigma had become attached to the name
“Confederate” because of the Confederacy’s association
with the institution of slavery.  The trial court concluded
that it would be “impractical and unduly burdensome for
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187 Id. at 111.
188 Id. at 112–13.
189 Id.  The court cited to Eason, supra note 135, at 406–07; see also infra note 301 and
accompanying text (discussing this case further).  See further discussion of this case—and of
Professor Eason’s article—in Part V.C, below.
190 See Vanderbilt Univ., 174 S.W.3d at 119 (finding donor’s remedy to be return of gift
based on consumer price index).
191 See Devin Varsalona, Vanderbilt U. Drops Fight over Name, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Wash., D.C.), July 29, 2005, at A3 (stating “confederate” will remain on building, but building
will be known as Memorial Hall).
192 797 A.2d 746 (Md. 2002).
Vanderbilt to continue to perform that part of the
contract pertaining to the maintenance of the name
‘Confederate’ on the building, and at the same time
pursue its academic purpose of obtaining a racially
diverse faculty and student body.”  The court found that
Vanderbilt had “carried its burden of proof for
modification of the contracts[ ]”. . . .187
The Tennessee Division of the United Daughters of the Confederacy
had sued for breach of contract, a declaratory judgment, and
compensatory damages.  The appellate court characterized the three
“contracts” at issue as “a gift with [ ] strings attached”; moreover,
“the 1927 contract expressly reserves to the Tennessee U.D.C. the
right to recall the gift if Peabody College [which later merged into
Vanderbilt] fails or ceases to comply with these conditions.”188  The
appellate court observed:  “Where a party makes a donation to a
charitable organization accompanied by conditions and a right to
reclaim the donation if the conditions are not met, the law treats the
arrangement between the parties as either a revocable charitable
trust or a charitable gift subject to conditions.”189  The court gave
Vanderbilt the choice of maintaining the name “Confederate
Memorial Hall” on the dormitory or returning the value in today’s
dollars of the original $50,000 gift.190  Vanderbilt University ended
the matter by agreeing to keep the name on the dormitory—as well
as by maintaining the dormitory itself.191
Contrast the Tennessee court’s contracts approach with Home for
Incurables v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation,192
not cited by the Tennessee court.  In the Maryland case, the high
court applied cy pres to void, on grounds of illegality, a whites-only
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193 Id. at 751.
194 Id. at 747, 751; see also infra notes 267–68 and accompanying text (discussing tension
between applying cy pres and awarding gift to alternative beneficiary).
195 See supra notes 24–34, 99–113 and accompanying text.
196 Blasko et al., supra note 6, at 69.
197 FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING, supra note 6, at 333.
198 See, e.g., San Diego County Council v. City of Escondido, 92 Cal. Rptr. 186, 190 n.1 (Cal.
Ct.  App. 1971) (“[W]e have not been influenced by the Attorney General’s statement made for
the first time at oral argument, he has now filed an action to enforce the trust.  Neither [of the
plaintiffs here] are parties to that action, and there is little likelihood they ever will be.
Whatever position the Attorney General wishes to take on the merits of the controversy, he
may properly assert when he is made a party and pleads in this action.”); see also Ahmad v.
Yale-New Haven Hosp., Inc., No. (X02)CV0401837255, 2004 WL 2361781, at *1 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Sept. 29, 2004) (granting standing to plaintiffs to bring an enforcement action under a “bed
funds” statute).  The court in Ahmad commented:
Of critical importance in this case is the fact that the plaintiffs do not ask
the court to construe, administer, enforce, modify, or even examine the
terms of any charitable gift.  Rather, the bed funds statute component of
the case focuses on statutory requirements of hospitals—such as giving
notice of bed funds and responding to applications for such funds—that do
not depend on the language of any particular trust or gift.  Largely for
these reasons, the attorney general’s office has taken the position that this
restriction in a gift to a nursing home.193  By so modifying the
restriction and allowing the now-integrated nursing home to keep
the money, the court defeated the direct action brought by the
alternative beneficiary, the University of Maryland (whose gift over
was not burdened by a discriminatory restriction).194
IV.  RELEVANCE OF THE REASON FOR LACK OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
ENFORCEMENT
Even without statutory authorization, courts will on rare occasion
grant standing to those with a “special interest.”195  The study by
Blasko et al. observed:  “If a court determines that the attorney
general is substantially ineffective, the probability increases that a
private party will be allowed to represent, in litigation, the public’s
beneficial interest in a charity.”196  Indeed, Marion Fremont-Smith
found that “[t]he overriding factor in almost every one of the cases
in which individuals were granted standing was the lack of effective
enforcement by the attorney general or another government
official.”197  Some courts that grant standing also comment that the
possibility of public enforcement does not displace the standing of
others.198
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aspect of the plaintiffs’ case does not infringe on its exclusive power to
enforce charitable trusts.
Id. at *5.
199 Marion Fremont-Smith’s survey of twenty-four cases decided between 1991 and 2001
found that six granted the right to bring suit to private parties, of whom none were living
donors and two were successors to donors.  FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING, supra note 6, at 331
(for a discussion of two of these cases, see Smithers v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723
N.Y.S.2d 426, 427 (App. Div. 2001); supra notes 68–73 and accompanying text; In re Trust of
Hill, 509 N.W.2d 168, 169 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); and infra note 210).  During the same period,
she found, the court denied standing in seventeen cases, four brought by donors or their heirs.
Id. (citing to several cases discussed in this Article:  Carl J. Herzog Found. v. Univ. of
Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997), discussed in Part II.C.1 above; Russell v. Yale Univ.,
737 A.2d 941, 943 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999), discussed infra note 200; In re Alaimo, 732 N.Y.S.2d
819, 819 (App. Div. 2001), discussed supra note 68).  One case was remanded to ascertain the
existence of a public interest.  Id.
200 See Carl J. Herzog Found. v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 996 (Conn. 1997) (in
which attorney general did not participate, for unknown reasons); see also Russell v. Yale
Univ., 737 A.2d 941, 943–44 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999) (affirming denial of standing to plaintiff
heir, alumni donors, and students in challenge to reorganization of the divinity school in which
the attorney general elected not to appear).
201 The Barnes Foundation, a Corporation (No. 10), 21 Pa. Fiduciary Rptr. 2d 351, 351,
353–54 (Orphans’ Ct. Aug. 1, 2001), aff’d without opinion, 803 A.2d 802 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
Of course, a court concerned about lack of attorney general
involvement need not elevate donors above other private parties as
having a special interest.  Indeed, in several notable recent cases in
which the public enforcement mechanism broke down, as perceived
by the court, the approved private plaintiff was not a donor (and the
courts did not apply contract theory in allowing standing).199
A. CASES NOT INVOLVING ATTORNEY GENERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Mere attorney general apathy is usually not enough to allow a
private party to bring suit.200  One proceeding brought by a neighbor
of the Barnes Foundation to compel the attorney general to bring
suit to stop the Foundation from using the property as a “Hall-for-
Rent” was dismissed for lack of standing, notwithstanding language
in the trust indenture providing for payment of legal expenses to
“any citizen” who brings a colorable action.201  The Orphan’s Court
ruled:  “Dr. Barnes’ insertion of this clause into the governing
instrument did not change the substantive law . . . as to the
appropriate parties to enforce charitable trusts.  Indeed, the
Restatement . . . indicates Dr. Barnes himself could not maintain this
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202 Id. at 353.
203 See In re Trust Under the Will of Fuller, 636 N.E.2d 1333, 1333 (Mass. 1994) (holding
probate and family court not bound by settlement agreed to by trustees and attorney general).
But see Smithers v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426, 444 (App. Div. 2001)
(Friedman, J., dissenting) (arguing for general rule that standing is limited to attorney
general).
204 See, e.g., Wiggen v. Attorney Gen. of Cal. (In re Estate of Leitner), No. B164824, 2004
WL 440202, *3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (“[W]e note that Wiggen properly carried out a valuable
function in this matter by bringing to the attention of the Attorney General possible problems
with the proper distribution of funds under the terms of the will.”).
In a 2004 proceeding involving the Barnes Foundation, the Orphans’ Court complained
that the attorney general failed to bring a sufficiently critical eye to the charity’s proposed
modification of a trust restriction:
The Attorney General, as parens patriae for charities, had an absolute
duty to probe, challenge and question every aspect of the monumental
changes now under consideration.  The law of standing, which has been
repeated so many times in opinions concerning The Barnes Foundation by
this court and Pennsylvania appellate courts, permits only trustees, the
Attorney General, and parties with a special interest in the charitable
trust to participate in actions involving the trust.  In these proceedings, the
three students were granted amicus curiae status, but their participation
was limited to exploring the impact of the proposals on The Foundation’s
education programs.  Thus, the Attorney General was the only party with
the authority to demand, via discovery or otherwise, information about
other options.  However, the Attorney General did not proceed on its
authority and even indicated its full support for the petition before the
hearings took place.  In court in December, the Attorney General’s Office
merely sat as second chair to counsel for The Foundation, cheering on its
witnesses and undermining the students’ attempts to establish their
issues.  The course of action chosen by the Office of the Attorney General
prevented the court from seeing a balanced, objective presentation of the
situation, and constituted an abdication of that office’s responsibility.
Indeed it was left to the court to raise questions relating to the finances of
the proposed move and the plan’s financial viability.
The Barnes Foundation, a Corporation, No. 58,788, Memorandum Opinion and Order Sur
Second Amended Petition to Amend Charter and Bylaws, Court of Common Pleas of
Montgomery County, Pennsylvania Orphans’ Court Division, slip op. at 20–21, 24 Pa.
Fiduciary Rptr. 2d 94 (Jan. 29, 2004) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).  Omitted footnote
14 conceded:  “The Attorney General’s Office did advocate for changes in the petition as
originally filed by The Foundation in September of 2002.  These changes, which were
incorporated in The Foundation’s amended and second amended petitions, did not touch on the
action.”202  Even when the attorney general was involved, some
parties want to sue in opposition to the attorney general’s position
in the hope that the judge, who has the last word, may disagree with
the attorney general’s position.203  In matters requiring court
approval, the court can obtain information necessary to reach a
decision short of admitting the private party as an intervenor; these
facts may instead be supplied by witnesses and amicus curiae.204
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proposal to relocate the gallery to Philadelphia.”  Id. at 107 n.14.  The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court separately ruled that a student whose petition to intervene was denied long before trial
and who waited until its conclusion lacked standing to challenge the decision.  In re Barnes
Found., 871 A.2d 792 (Pa. 2005).  See generally Terrance A. Kline, Comment on the Barnes
Foundation, 31 ACTEC J. 245 (2005) (written by attorney for students appointed amicus
curiae by court).
205 See infra notes 219–50 and accompanying text.
206 See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text.
207 Robert Schalkenbach Found. v. Lincoln Found., Inc., 91 P.3d 1019, 1028 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2004).
208 Id. at 1028.
Rather, courts that grant standing to private parties often appear
to require an unacceptable level of regulatory neglect, if not an
outright disabling conflict of interest that impedes attorney general
action.205  The contrary is also true:  private standing will usually be
denied when the attorney general affirmatively determines not to
act.  In the recent Schalkenbach Foundation case,206 the court
considered “whether the Attorney General’s Office would be able to
enforce the trust if it concluded that Arizona citizens were being
harmed by the Foundation’s alleged breach, or whether the lack of
enforcement by the Attorney General is due to a conflict of interest,
ineffectiveness, or lack of resources.”207  The court noted:  
[A]t oral argument, the Office of the Attorney General
stated that its decision to not enforce this trust was not
influenced by lack of resources.  While the Office of the
Attorney General cannot be expected to enforce any and
all violations of charitable trusts, no matter how trivial,
we do not see evidence of neglect of the public interest in
this case.208
Some states appear more liberal, but it is difficult to determine
from the few cases that exist whether the courts intend their rulings
to extend beyond the particulars of the cases.  Recall the dicta,
quoted above by the trial court in the Robertson family’s suit against
Princeton, from the New Jersey chancery division decision in City of
Paterson (a case not involving donors) that “[t]he threshold for
standing in cases involving charitable corporations is very low” and
that, due to lack of resources granted the attorney general “to
provide extensive supervision, there is a strong public interest in
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209 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
210 In re Trust of Hill, 509 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993): 
When the attorney general does not appear to represent the interest of
trust beneficiaries, other courts have granted standing to members of the
public in order to protect the public interest.  As a former trustee and a
Louis W. Hill, Sr. descendant, Louis Fors Hill is in a position to
understand the purpose and operation of the trust.  Given the absence of
a party to protect the public interest and Louis Fors Hill’s status as a
former trustee and as Louis W. Hill, Sr.’s descendant, we hold Louis Fors
Hill had a sufficient interest in the trust to give him standing under Minn.
Stat. § 501B.16.
Id. (citations omitted).  The appellate court found that the trial court exceeded its authority
in approving the trustees’ proposal to amend the process for selecting trustees; under the
process determined by the settlor, the court appoints the trustees, and the proposal would
have required the court to select from those nominated by a committee appointed by the
trustees.  Id. at 170 & n.1, 172–73.  The proposal would also have had the effect that “both
Louis Fors Hill and Louis W. Hill, Jr., as descendants of Louis W. Hill, Sr., could be excluded
from the nominating committee if either one was a director of the Foundation [owned by the
trust].”  Id. at 170.
211 The court commented only:  “The attorney general was notified of a hearing that was
scheduled on the matter, but did not appear or participate in the proceeding.”  Id.
212 See supra notes 14, 38–40 and accompanying text.  Specifically, the court in City of
Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859, 867–68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) ruled:
Under the Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act
(Gov. Code, §§ 12580 – 12599.5), “[t]he primary responsibility for
supervising charitable trusts in California, for insuring compliance with
trusts and articles of incorporation, and for protection of assets held by
charitable trusts and public benefit corporations, resides in the Attorney
General” (id., § 12598, subd. (a)).  Accordingly, “no court shall have
jurisdiction to modify or terminate any trust of property for charitable
purposes unless the Attorney General is a party to the proceedings.” (Id.,
allowing standing for individuals to bring these kinds of suits that
should not be frustrated by stringent requirements.”209  In a
Minnesota case that similarly employed expansive language (in a
proceeding to modify a charitable trust), the appeals court granted
standing to a descendant of the charitable settlor, but the plaintiff
was also a former trustee, which could alone be grounds for
standing.210  Unfortunately, that court did not explain why the
attorney general did not participate.211
Finally, in two specific situations where the attorney general is
divested of jurisdiction, courts might allow private parties to
proceed.  First, two California appellate court decisions held that if
the transfer is a conditional gift that does not create a charitable
trust, the donor has standing to sue for the return of the property,
and the attorney general is not a necessary party.212  As mentioned,
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§ 12591.)  Noting that he has never been made a party to the City’s action,
the Attorney General asserts that the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over that action.
As explained above, the Deed created a fee simple subject to a condition
subsequent, not a charitable trust.  Therefore, the Attorney General is not
a necessary party to the action, and the trial court did not lack subject
matter jurisdiction.
Id.
213 See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text.
214 In re Estate of Estes, 523 N.W.2d 863, 864–65, 867 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
215 Id. at 865.
216 Id. at 867 (citation omitted).  The court also noted:
[W]here trust property is held by an officer or officers of a religious
organization, the religious organization is exempted from provisions of the
[Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes] act.  Thus, because the
governing board of [the church] is the sole trustee of the charitable trust
created under [the will,] the Attorney General was not an interested party
and accordingly was divested of jurisdiction in the matter.
the alarming potential that the attorney general might be bypassed
in a private suit to reclaim the gift argues even more strongly
against characterizing restricted gifts as conditional gifts.213
Second, some states’ statutes explicitly exempt religious
organizations from attorney general oversight.  In a recent Michigan
appellate court case, the court granted standing to a charitable
foundation that was the residuary beneficiary of the will of a woman
who had devised $300,000 to a church, to be used solely for purposes
of building a new church.214  The charity filed a petition under the
state’s version of UMIFA to release the restriction, because it did not
and would not foreseeably need a new facility.215  Citing City of
Paterson in addition to Michigan case law, the court ruled:
Because the Attorney General has been divested of
jurisdiction, and no beneficiary or cotrustee has stepped
forward to challenge CUMC’s petition, we believe that
dismissal of this appeal would be inappropriate without
taking a broad view of the Foundation’s standing in this
matter.  Thus, we concur in the trend, recognized by this
Court, toward “substantially liberal[izing] the concept of
standing so as to greatly reduce standing as a bar to
litigation.”  In this respect, we are convinced that the
Foundation’s participation has assured sincere and
vigorous advocacy.216
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Id. at 866 (citation omitted).
217 Compare Weaver v. Wood, 680 N.E.2d 918, 923 (Mass. 1997) (denying standing), with
Niemann v. Vaughn Cmty. Church, 113 P.3d 463, 473–80 (Wash. 2005) (addressing merits of
parishioner’s suit without discussing standing).
218 Warren v. Bd. of Regents, 544 S.E.2d 190, 194 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
219 Id.
220 Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. State, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 12, 2003, at 18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 6, 2003).
221 Id.  At the time of the conversion it was expected that the deal was worth about $1–$2
billion, but subsequent merger discussions with WellPoint valued the public fund’s holdings
at more than $4 billion.  See Andrew Ross Sorkin & Milt Freudenheim, WellPoint Near Deal
to Acquire Big Rival, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2005, at C1.
222 Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 229 N.Y.L.J., Mar. 12, 2003, at 18.
Standing in the religious context is not, however, universally
resolved in favor of members.217
B. ATTORNEY GENERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Even an attorney general conflict of interest might not be enough
to bestow standing on a private party.  In a case involving the
enforcement of a trust for a chair at the University of Georgia, the
donors were unsuccessful in obtaining standing based on their
assertion that the attorney general, who also represented the
defendant board of regents, had a conflict of interest.218  The court
concluded that “the remedy for a conflict of interest is to involve the
district attorney or appoint a Special Assistant Attorney General.
Such a conflict certainly would not mandate that persons with no
‘special interest’ (such as plaintiffs here) be granted standing to
enforce a charitable trust.”219
In an unusual case that might better be classified as a direct,
rather than a derivative, action, a New York trial court granted
“quasi-derivative standing,” over the objection of the attorney
general, to plaintiffs (including the Consumers Union) who contested
the conversion to for-profit status of the billion-dollar health insurer,
Empire Blue Cross.220  As directed by the legislation authorizing the
conversion, 95% of the proceeds would go to New York state to fund
pay increases for health care workers.221  The court commented that
while the attorney general usually has exclusive standing to enforce
charitable assets, anyone with a “special interest” also has
standing.222  Moreover, the court noted that the attorney general, as
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223 Id.
224 Id.  As the Court of Appeals later made clear, though, Empire Blue Cross, while
nonprofit, was not a charity (it was classified under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4), not § 501(c)(3)).
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. State, 840 N.E.2d 68, 728 n.3, 84 & n.25 (N.Y. 2005).
225 Id. at 81–82.
required, is defending the statute, and so “the beneficiaries . . . are
here cast upon their own devises.”223  The court concluded:
In any event, the rules limiting standing to enforce the
terms of charitable trusts, and the exceptions to those
rules, apply to lawsuits brought against the directors or
managers of such trusts.  Defendants have adduced no
case, and I know of none, that holds, or even suggests,
that those rules limit the general rules that govern
standing to challenge the constitutionality of a state
statute.  The individual plaintiffs and CU have shown
that they, or the members whom they represent here, are
likely to suffer injury-in-fact, as a result of the
conversion of Empire, which injury will not be shared by
the general public.  Accordingly, these plaintiffs have
standing to challenge the Statute.224
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed by granting the plaintiffs
“quasi-derivative standing,” writing:
[W]hile plaintiffs are not true beneficiaries, as
subscribers they benefit from whatever vestiges may
remain from Empire’s traditional role as the “insurer of
last resort” for those New Yorkers otherwise unable to
obtain needed health care.  Nor can we ignore the
billions of dollars at stake.  Accordingly, because of the
Attorney General’s and the Board’s unique position after
the adoption of Chapter 1, we hold that plaintiff
subscribers have standing to prosecute this action solely
for purposes of protecting Empire’s not-for-profit
assets.225
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226 Consumers Union of U.S. Inc., N.Y.L.J., Mar. 12, 2003, at 18.
227 Consumers Union of U.S. Inc., 840 N.E.2d at 85.
228 In re Milton Hershey Sch., 867 A.2d 674 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005), rev’d, 911 A.2d 1258
(2006).
229 Id. at 678–79.
230 Id. at 679 n.2.
231 Id. at 679.
232 Id.
On reaching the merits, however, the trial court had rejected the
charge of breach of fiduciary duty and further rejected the charge
that the legislation amounted to an unconstitutional taking.226  The
New York high court agreed and ordered the case dismissed.227
For the most thorough analysis of standing granted in a case of
asserted attorney general conflict of interest, see the 2005 four-to-
three decision by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court granting
standing to an alumni association to contest a new settlement
entered into by the Milton Hershey School and the Pennsylvania
attorney general.228  Ultimately, however, as described below, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed.
The Milton Hershey School Alumni Association, a nonprofit
corporation separate from the school, had long been active in voicing
its complaints over the school’s management.229  On July 31, 2002
the Hershey School, governed by the Hershey Trust, entered into a
closing agreement with the attorney general calling for some
management and policy changes.230  The Commonwealth Court
credited the alumni association not only with alerting the attorney
general “to what the Association believed were serious improprieties
associated with the administration of the Trust” but also with
funding the investigation when the Office of Attorney General
“initially resisted conducting an investigation and only agreed to
proceed if the Association committed more resources to the
investigation.”231  The court added:  “The Association participated in
an advisory role and contributed millions of dollars to the process.
Though it was not a party to the ultimate agreement, the
Association acted to protect its own central purpose of preserving
bonds formed in orphanhood and furthering the child-saving mission
of the Trust.”232
Several months after the school and the attorney general reached
their settlement, the Hershey School and Trust radically
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233 Id. at 680.
234 Id.
235 See Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law
Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 985–99 (2004). 
236 In re Milton Hershey Sch., 867 A.2d at 680.
237 Id. at 685.
restructured the governing board.233  This move followed dramatic
legal events involving the Hershey Trust’s attempt to diversify its
portfolio by selling its controlling interest in the Hershey Foods
Company.234  The attorney general—asserting a duty to protect the
community—had promptly sought and won an injunction against the
attempted diversification, and the legislature had adopted special
charitable-investment legislation to preserve local ownership.235  The
school, trust, and attorney general modified their 2002 settlement on
June 27, 2003, to prevent fiduciary conflicts of interest and to
tighten the qualification standards for students.236  Unhappy with
this re-struck agreement, the alumni association brought suit.
The Commonwealth Court acknowledged:
In Pennsylvania, and all other states, for that matter,
the attorney general under its parens patriae authority
is the watch dog that supervises the administration of
charitable trusts to ensure that the object of the trust
remains charitable and to ensure that the charitable
purpose of the trust is carried out.237
However, the strategy of the attorney general in seeking to block the
Hershey Trust’s sale of Hershey Foods Corporation came back to
haunt it:
Unlike other states, however, the OAG [Office of
Attorney General] takes the position that it has the
power to oppose that which may be in the best interests
of the trust and examine the effects that the actions of
the trust have on the larger community.  In its petition
opposing the Trust’s proposed sale of its controlling
interest in HFC [Hershey Foods Company], the OAG
acknowledged that the sale would likely diversify and
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238 Id. at 686 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).  The court cited Brody, supra note 235,
for the proposition that the attorney general’s political goals can lead to conflicts of interest
that undermine the policy of exclusive attorney general standing.  In re Milton Hershey Sch.,
867 A.2d at 686–87 n.22.
239 Id. at 683.
240 Id. (quoting In re Biester, 409 A.2d 848, 851 (Pa. 1979)).
241 Id. at 683–84.  The standing requirement also allows the courts to avoid disputes
committed to another branch of government, a policy enforced particularly vigorously at the
federal level.  Thus, a taxpayer as such has no standing to complain about the tax exemption
that Congress granted to a given class of charities, or about the decision of the Internal
Revenue Service not to seek revocation of a particular charity’s exemption.  See In re U.S.
increase the assets of the Trust, but nonetheless objected
to the sale because any sale would have profound
negative consequences for the Hershey community and
surrounding areas, including but not limited to the
closing and/or withdrawal of HFC from the local
community, together with a dramatic loss of the region’s
employment opportunities, related businesses and tax
base.  Agreeing with that view, the trial court, in that
case, held that the OAG could take those views into
consideration and ordered that those concerns were
sufficient to stop any efforts by the Trust to sell its
interest in HFC.  As defined by the OAG, its role, in
certain circumstances, is to protect the interests of both
the beneficiaries of the Trust and the surrounding
community and, where necessary, to balance those
interests.238
The court began its analysis of standing by observing:
“Pennsylvania has its own standing jurisprudence, although the
doctrine of standing in this Commonwealth is recognized primarily
as a doctrine of judicial restraint and not one having any basis in the
Pennsylvania Constitution.”239  In sum:  “Fundamentally, the
standing requirement in Pennsylvania ‘is to protect against
improper plaintiffs.’ ”240  The court characterized Pennsylvania’s
standing doctrine as “flexible,” in contrast to the federal standards,
“perhaps because the lack of standing in Pennsylvania does not
necessarily deprive the court of jurisdiction, whereas a lack of
standing in the federal arena is directly correlated to the ability of
the court to maintain jurisdiction over the action.”241  Pennsylvania
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Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1027–28 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that taxpayers lacked
standing to challenge tax exempt status of Catholic Church); cf. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 46 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I cannot now imagine a case . . .
where a person whose own tax liability was not affected ever could have standing to litigate
the federal tax liability of someone else.”).  In a footnote, the Commonwealth Court expanded
on the federal requirements for standing, beginning with a citation to Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992):  “The federal test is a three part inquiry:  (1) Has the
party bringing the action alleged an ‘injury in fact’?  (2) Is there a causal connection between
the alleged wrongdoing and the injury suffered?  (3) Will a favorable ruling by the court likely
redress the alleged injury?”  In re Milton Hershey Sch., 867 A.2d at 683 n.15.  Moreover,
[b]eyond the constitutional requirements, the federal judiciary has also
adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the question of
standing.  Thus, [the U.S. Supreme] Court has held that “the plaintiff
generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest
his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464 , 474 (1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 190, 499 (1975)).
242 In re Milton Hershey Sch., 867 A.2d at 684 (quoting William Penn Parking Garage, Inc.
v. City of Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269, 281 (Pa. 1975), and citing S. Whitehall Twp. Police Serv.
v. S. Whitehall Twp., 555 A.2d 793, 795 (Pa. 1989)).  Moreover, observed the court, state-level
“taxpayer standing” cases relax even these general standing rules,
where the party asserting the action can show that (1) government action
will otherwise go unchallenged unless standing is granted; (2) those most
directly affected by government action would benefit and would not
challenge the action; (3) judicial relief is appropriate; (4) alternative
remedies are not available; and (5) no one other than the party asserting
the action is better suited to demonstrate an injury distinct from that of an
ordinary taxpayer.
Id.
243 Id. at 688.  The court’s five-part test to determine special interest standing considers:
(1) the extraordinary nature of the acts complained of and the remedy
sought; (2) the presence of fraud or misconduct on the part of the charity
or its directors; (3) the attorney general’s availability or effectiveness; (4)
the nature of the benefited class and its relationship to the charity; and (5)
subjective, case-specific circumstances.
Id. at 689; see also Blasko et al., supra note 6, at 61–78, 83–84 (making recommendations that
were quoted extensively in In re Milton Hershey School).
requires the plaintiff to have a “substantial, direct, and immediate
interest” (not necessarily pecuniary).242
The Commonwealth Court then turned to the special interest
ground for private standing, endorsing a multi-factor test that would
result in “fairness and predictability.”243  In conclusion, the court
ruled:
Given the nature of these events, given the enormous
amount of money at stake, and given that the
Association merely seeks to determine whether the July
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244 In re Milton Hershey Sch., 867 A.2d at 690.
245 Id.
246 Id. (footnote omitted).
247 Id. at 691 (Colins, J., dissenting).
2002 Reform Agreement will better serve the charitable
purpose of the Trust instead of the June 2003 Agreement
struck by the OAG, the School, and the Trust, the
Association has pled a special interest in this matter.244
Moreover, the court found that the association “is the only other
party with a sufficient relationship to the Trust that would have any
interest in assuring that its charitable purpose was achieved.”245
Finally, the court observed:
That inquiry is neither vexatious nor unreasonable.
Given the nature of this Trust, its status as the largest
residential childcare charity in the world, and the fact
that the OAG agreed to modify the July 2002 Reform
Agreement, this scrutiny will serve the public interest in
assuring that the Trust is operating efficiently and
effectively to serve its beneficiaries.246
The three-judge dissenting opinion asserted simply:
It is clear from the historical background of this saga
that the Settlors in no way intended to give the Alumni
Association standing in the administration of the Trust.
The Settlor, Milton Hershey, was also the creator of the
Alumni Association.  To now give the Association legal
rights that were expressly excluded by the Settlor of the
Trust is a dangerous expansion of standing not
supported by over 300 years of case law within the
Commonwealth.247
The dissent added:  “To allow the Alumni Association standing, no
matter how eleemosynary its purpose may be, interferes with the
efficient performance of the Attorney General’s statutorily-mandated
duties, as well as being violative of the wishes of the Settlor of the
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248 Id. at 692.
249 Id.
250 In re Milton Hershey Sch., 911 A.2d 1258, 1258 (Pa. 2006) (Baldwin, J. and Saylor, J.,
not participating).
251 Id. at 1263.
252 Id. (citation omitted).
Trust and founder of the Alumni Association.”248  The dissent
concluded:  “Such a quantum leap away from historical concepts of
standing, based upon public policy considerations, and a
judicially-created ‘special interest,’ may only be undertaken by the
Supreme Court of the Commonwealth.”249
On December 28, 2006, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
unanimously reversed, agreeing with these dissenters.250  The court
concluded:  “To give the Association ‘special interest’ standing where
the settlors of the Trust specifically denied beneficiary status to its
members, would surely contravene the settlors’ intent expressed
through their written trust.”251  Moreover:
Nothing in this litigation would affect the Association
itself; it loses nothing and gains nothing.  The
Association’s intensity of concern is real and
commendable, but it is not a substitute for an actual
interest.  Standing is not created through the
Association’s advocacy or its members’ past close
relationship with the School as former individual
recipients of the Trust’s benefits.  The Trust did not
contemplate the Association, or anyone else, to be a
“shadow board” of graduates with standing to challenge
actions the Board takes. 
. . . .  Current law allowed the Association, an outside
group, to urge the Attorney General to enforce the Trust.
However, the Association’s disagreement with the
Attorney General’s decision to modify the 2002
agreement does not vest the Association with standing to
challenge that decision in court.  Ultimately, the
Association’s dismay is more properly directed at the
Attorney General’s actions and decisions; it is
insufficient to establish standing here.252
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253 Chester,  supra note 87, at 630:  “Rather than using property, contract, or other lenses
that Professor Gaubatz suggests to help determine standing, I prefer to look at the nature of
the charitable transfer for answers.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  Professor Chester “would argue
that the charity’s express acceptance of the terms that define the use of the gift should confer
standing, but only as to the enforcement of those terms” and not “to seek return of the gift
itself.”  Id. at 632–33.  He adds that “if specific performance is impracticable because of the
misappropriation of all or part of the gift, the grantor can sue for damages to restore the gift
to its appropriate size, at which point specific performance of the original purpose may become
feasible.”  Id. at 634.
In preliminary reaction to questions I raise in my ALI draft, Professor John Simon
suggested to me:  “[H]ow about (a) requiring that the donor request that the AG proceed as a
precursor to donor suit – which may discourage some litigants . . . .”  Email from John Simon
to author (June 2, 2005).
V.  DESIGNING A POSITIVE LAW OF “GIFTRACTS”
A. INTRODUCTION
While I might differ with reformers on particular design features,
I agree with whose who believe that neither traditional charitable
trust law nor pure contract law is appropriate for addressing donor
standing and that the legal framework would benefit from a
declaration of a “third way” to handle restricted gifts to corporate
charities.253  Although I do not use the term “giftracts” in my ALI
project, I use it here to emphasize that although a restricted gift
constitutes an agreement between the donor and the charity, it is
not merely a contract in the private law sense—rather, an
unascertainable group constitutes the true beneficiaries.
Moreover, underlying the approach taken in the ALI draft is my
general wariness of over-privileging “donor intent,” because I view
that term as shorthand for a web of actors and actions.  A gift can be
legally restricted because of conditions initiated and drafted by the
donors’ attorneys, or by actions taken by the charity itself in
soliciting the gift.  The wooing of a major donor is a long-term
endeavor, but neither the current development officer nor the donor
might be available when it is time to deal with imprecise or poorly-
thought-through restrictions.  While determining intent is a general
problem in contract law, the longevity of the restriction in the
charity context argues for increased scrutiny—and even
skepticism—of claims about what the donor intended.
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254 See generally Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals:  The Economic Convergence of
the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457 (1996)
(examining various consistencies of charity).
255 A charity that accepts restricted gifts (or that raises funds for specific, identified
purposes) should take steps to ensure that its staff and advisors are aware of their obligations
and adhere to specified requirements.  Section 513(b) of New York’s Not-for-Profit Corporation
Law contains specific requirements, providing, in relevant part:
The governing board shall cause accurate accounts to be kept of such
assets separate and apart from the accounts of other assets of the
corporation.  Unless the terms of the particular gift instrument provide
otherwise, the treasurer shall make an annual report to the members (if
there be members) or to the governing board (if there be no members)
concerning the assets held under this section and the use made of such
assets and of the income thereof.
N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW 513(b) (McKinney 2002).
256 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 450 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005).
Fundamentally, recognizing a restriction as perpetual clashes
with the reality that a charity or restricted gift must be carried out
by mortal persons.  Donors, trustees, directors, and officers—as well
as the beneficiaries and clients—all come and go, as fate and
circumstances dictate, and have their own, possibly diverging,
interests.254  After a donor is dead, those who purport to speak for
the donor might have very different goals.  Children might resent
the charitable gift or bequest that would otherwise have gone to
them.  The officers and employees of an institutional donor might
have their own career desires.  On the receiving charity’s end,
despite their best intentions, many charities suffer incentive and
agency problems, including poor internal communication and
frequent staff turnover.255  By the time a question about compliance
with the restriction arises, relations between the charity and the
donor (or the donor’s descendants) might have soured.  Memories
can fail, or become self-serving, about promises that were made.
Consequently, under ALI Preliminary Draft No. 3 the passage of
time affects both the cy pres proceeding and the ability of a private
party to enforce a gift restriction.256
The issues raised in this Article are addressed in two separate
chapters of the part on charities in the ALI project, Chapter 4 (Gifts)
and Chapter 7 (Oversight and Enforcement).  Preliminary Draft No.
3, published in May 2005, left open many important issues.  I will be
revising Chapter 4 for discussion with the project’s Advisers and
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257 Preliminary Draft No. 4 will also contain a revised Chapter 2 on organization of a
charity and structural change.  See id. § 240; supra note 74 (describing Section 240).
258 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 400 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005).
259 Id. § 425.
260 Chapter 3 is the subject of Tentative Draft No. 1 (March 19, 2007), to be presented for
vote of the ALI membership at the May 2007 Annual Meeting.
261 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. §§ 430, 440 (Preliminary Draft No. 3,
2005).
262 Id. § 750.
Members Consultative Group in June 2007.257  Following customary
ALI practice, I will revise that Preliminary Draft No. 4 for discussion
with the ALI Council.  If they approve the text, I will revise the
Council draft to take into account their suggestions and comments
and prepare a tentative draft to present to the ALI membership for
approval.  Separately and next, I will redraft Chapter 7 (to be
renumbered as Chapter 6 and retitled Supervision and
Enforcement).  That draft chapter will set forth the principles for
donor standing (as well as sections on the standing of a variety of
charity constituents) to enforce the performance of restricted gifts
(as well as the performance of fiduciary duties in general).
The discussion in this Part of the Article addresses relevant
provisions of ALI draft Chapter 4 separately from the standing
provisions in draft Chapter 7.  As a threshold matter, draft
Chapter 4 provides that a gift once made is no longer the donor’s
property (see Section 400),258 and that the fiduciaries of a charity
must, within the bounds of their fiduciary duties, be trusted to
exercise their wisdom and discretion in implementing donor intent
(see Section 425).259  (See also Chapter 3, addressing governance and
fiduciary duties generally.260)  Moreover, society depends on the
fiduciaries, supported by the state, to recognize that “the” charitable
interest changes over time and with changes in circumstances, and,
when appropriate, to take action to seek modification of a restriction
(see Sections 430 and 440).261  As discussed in Part V.B of this
Article, draft Chapter 7 provides that while restricted gifts are
enforceable by the attorney general, they are not enforceable by the
donor unless the donor, with the consent of the charity, expressly
retained the right to sue.262  As discussed in Part V.C of this Article,
Section 450 addresses the effects of the passage of time, both on the
substantive issue of the how closely to adhere to the donor’s intent
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and on the procedural issue of permitting private parties to
enforce.263  The discussion also describes the open policy and design
issues.  Part V.D of this Article, proposes answers to the four
hypothetical cases set forth at the beginning of this Article.
B. STANDING OF DONOR (OR ALTERNATIVE BENEFICIARY):  DIRECT AND
DERIVATIVE SUITS
The section on donor standing in Preliminary Draft No. 3 appears
in Section 750 (to be renumbered Section 650 in subsequent drafts).
The black letter provides that “[t]he donor or successor in interest
(including an alternative beneficiary of a ‘gift over’) has standing”—
(a) To initiate an action to obtain the property if so
permitted by the gift instrument [and law and public
policy]; and
(b) To enforce a gift restriction as may be provided by
the gift instrument [and the court] or to bring a
derivative suit as provided in § 780.264
The uncertainties expressed by the brackets recognize the following
policy questions, drawn from the draft Comments to Section 750.
1. Direct Action by Donor or by Alternative Beneficiary of a Gift
Over.  Consistent with current law, as described above in Part II,
Preliminary Draft No. 3 distinguishes “direct” actions from
“derivative” actions.265  In a direct action, the plaintiff seeks to
enforce his or her own rights, and any monetary recovery would
generally go to the plaintiff.  Since standing is appropriately
recognized for a private party whose own rights are injured, a donor
should be permitted to bring suit to recover a restricted gift that
fails—but only if the donor has expressly reserved the possibility of
reverter.
As mentioned in Part I.A of this Article, a “gift over” performs
both a substantive and a procedural function.  Substantively, at
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266 Id. § 440(d).
267 See generally Ronald Chester, Cy Pres or Gift Over:  The Search for Coherence in
Judicial Reform of Failed Charitable Trusts, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 41 (1989) (discussing effect
of gift over on ability to modify restriction).  Courts do not universally accept that a gift over
negates the current charity’s ability to seek deviation or cy pres relief.  Id.  Preliminary Draft
No. 3 proposes that the better approach to take in cases like this could be to liberally construe
situations in which the doctrine of deviation rather than cy pres might be applied, and then
to defeat application of the gift over only in cases of deviation.  See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NONPROFIT ORGS. § 440 cmt. f (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005).  In the deviation context, see
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Quincy, 258 N.E.2d 745, 753 (Mass. 1970), in which the court
rejected the claim of the alternative beneficiary and instead granted deviation to the original
donee.  Id.  The Quincy court cited to DiClerico, Cy Pres:  A Proposal for Change, 47 B.U. L.
REV. 153, 192–95, 
least in theory, the gift over is a declaration of intent by the donor
that the specified purpose is more important to the donor than the
identity of the charity carrying out the restriction.  Procedurally, the
technique is designed to induce the original donee to adhere to the
restriction while providing an incentive to the alternative charity to
exercise vigilance in monitoring the initial donee’s use of the funds.
In practice, though, a gift over might just reflect the donor’s fear that
the original recipient could fail or otherwise terminate existence.  In
any event, many gifts over designate an established institution as
the alternative beneficiary and do not impose any restriction on the
alternative beneficiary’s use of the gift.
What can a donor do who wants to use the gift-over technique in
order to ensure a vigilant monitor, but who does not want the initial
donee to lose the funds when the change in use is not its fault—that
is, when the donor does not want simply to make a conditional gift?
First, intentions expressed in the gift instrument will control.
Otherwise, draft Section 440 suggests that deviation, but not cy pres,
would appropriately apply to defeat the claims of the alternative
beneficiary, as an interpretation of the restriction.266  Specifically, if
the restriction is administrative rather than material to the donor’s
charitable purpose, Subsection (d) of draft Section 440 proposes that
a deviation proceeding will trump a suit by the alternative
beneficiary.  However, in cy pres cases, the gift over generally takes
effect rather than modification of the restriction, based on the policy
that the occasional perceived windfall to the alternative beneficiary
could be viewed as the price of effective monitoring and
enforcement.267  As just suggested, the donor, of course, can override
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where it is suggested, we think correctly, that (a) noncompliance with
detailed provisions of a charitable trust should not give rise to a transfer
to an alternative trust, if such provisions are not of controlling importance
in relation to the general framework of the testator’s scheme, and (b) a ‘gift
over . . . [should] be resorted to only when it appears to the court that more
benefit to the community would be derived from the alternative disposition
and that nobody would be substantially damaged by terminating the
original trust’ (p. 194).
Quincy, 258 N.E.2d at 753 .  In the cy pres context, see generally Home for Incurables v.
University of Maryland Medical System Corp., 797 A.2d 746 (Md. 2002) (applying cy press
rather than the gift over, refusing to enforce illegal racially discriminatory condition).
268 Preliminary Draft No. 3, Section 750, Comment b provides the following illustration:
5.  Donor H made a gift to U University for stem cell and cloning research,
with a gift over to H University if U University does not comply with the
restriction.  These activities were legal when the gift was made, and not in
violation of fundamental public policy.  Aware of the controversial nature
of these activities, though, H stated in the gift instrument that if both of
these activities should become illegal, U University may retain the funds
for such medical research purposes as it determines to be most useful to
society.  H University may sue for the gift only if U University breaches
the purposes of the restriction for reasons other than illegality.
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 750 cmt. b (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005).
269 Id. cmt. f.
270 See supra notes 22–156 and accompanying text.
this policy, and the draft Principles encourage the donor to set forth
the conditions for ignoring the gift over and instead for applying cy
pres.268  Draft Comment f to Section 750 concludes with questions
about the interaction of the ability of an alternative beneficiary to
bring a direct action to sue for the gift with the policy that puts a
time limit on private enforcement:
If the donor or donor-designated private party lacks
enforcement powers after a certain period of time, what
logic allows the donor to sue for reverter or the
alternative beneficiary to sue for a gift over after this
time period?  Do we want to maintain a distinction
between a suit to enforce the restriction and a suit in
which the plaintiff has an adverse interest?269
2. Derivative Suit by Donors:  Open (Legislative?) Issues.
a. Allowance of Donor Standing to Enforce Restriction.
Preliminary Draft No. 3 reflects the general rule that donors have no
legal authority to sue to enforce charitable duties.270  This leaves the
1264 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1183
271 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 750 cmt. c (Preliminary Draft No. 3,
2005).  Reporter’s Note 6 asks, in brackets:  “[So can standing be bestowed by the parties – i.e.,
waived by the charity?].”  Id.
272 Id. §§ 415, 460.
273 At the NCPL conference, supra note *, attorney Victoria Bjorklund commented that she
had just finished reading a fifty-two page gift instrument and wondered whether the donor
really meant all the terms that the drafter had included.  She suggested not only that charities
should “push back,” but also that donors’ counsel must do a more thoughtful job of crafting
appropriate terms.
274 See supra notes 86–113 and accompanying text.
275 Cf. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 58 (1937).  The Comments end:  “It is
suggested that gifts of considerable size may be assumed to be conditional, that other gifts not
involving peculiar features, such as heirlooms, and not for the primary purpose of being used
after marriage by the parties, should be regarded as absolute and should be incapable of
recovery.”  Id. cmt. c, notes.
legal question of whether parties, by agreement, can confer donor
standing on the courts in the absence of a statute.271
Despite my reservations, draft Section 750 permits a charity to
waive a donor’s lack of standing under the common law, but only by
explicit agreement.  Moreover, Comment c provides that not all
restricted gifts give rise to donor standing:  “First, the restriction
must arise in a gift instrument, or through a written or otherwise
recorded charity solicitation.  Second, a donor’s legal rights to
monitor and enforce are only those as are set forth in the gift
instrument.  Of course, the charity should reasonably keep donors
and other constituents informed as a matter of good practice. . . .
Finally, overriding interests of public policy can nullify donor powers
set forth in the gift instrument.”272  Notably, the nonprofit sector
rightly fears the prospects of ever-lengthier gift instruments drafted
by counsel purporting to express donor intent.273
That Comment in the ALI draft also addresses complications
(some of which were discussed in Parts II.C.2 and 3)274 implicated by
the donor standing provision in the Uniform Trust Code and
UPMIFA’s abandonment of a similar provision.  A sensible
resolution seems to require a legislative solution, such as to provide
threshold dollar amounts.  The draft Comment does the best it can,
by suggesting that the charitable donor lacks standing unless the
amount of the restricted gift is “material,”275 and adding:  “Even in
the absence of legislation, a court should ordinarily dismiss a suit
involving a gift of less than [$10,000], and could justify on policy
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276 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 750 cmt. c (Preliminary Draft No. 3,
2005).
277 See infra notes 284–302 and accompanying text.
278 Comments of Harvey Dale, as discussant on this Article at NCPL conference discussed
supra note *.
279 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 750 cmt. d (Preliminary Draft No. 3,
2005).  And if “the donor is incompetent—who wins as between a court-appointed conservator
and the trustee?”  Id.
280 Compare comments of Harvey Goldschmid, as discussant on this Article at NPCL
conference discussed supra note *:  He would allow standing, regardless of the terms of the gift
instrument, to appropriate parties to enforce restricted gifts but not to sue for return of the
gift.  He would also honor a gift instrument that provides that the donor or the donor’s family
not have standing.
grounds dismissing a suit involving a gift of less than [$_______].”276
Similarly, legislation could add certainty to the provision in
Section 450(c) that cuts off private but not attorney general
enforcement rights after the passage of a period of time.277  Professor
Harvey Dale suggests a different tack for a legislative fix:  instead
of focusing on substantive donor intent, statutes should emphasize
procedural donor intent.  Specifically, he recommends that statutes
set forth one or more procedural mechanisms for decisionmaking to
adapt to future change, and require attorneys general and courts to
give “substantial deference” to the donor’s up-front choice of
procedure.278
Draft Comment d to Section 750 declares that when the donor as
donor is granted enforcement rights by the gift instrument or by
statute, that right does not extend to fiduciary decisions not
involving the use of the gift.
Finally, how readily should the law honor negotiated standing for
private parties other than the donor such as the donor’s successor in
interest or even, for the donor that is an institution, once it is not
populated by the same persons who made the gift?  Draft Comment
d asks whether the rule should be absolute that the donor’s standing
may not be assigned, devised, or carried out by a personal
representative.279  That draft Comment then asks how such a rule
squares with the gift instrument that provides for a “visitor” or
“trust protector” to enforce the intent of the donor.280
b. Attorney General Behavior.  Draft Chapter 7’s Introductory
Note to Topic 2—Private Enforcement:  Responsibility and
Standing—raises the issue of whether the standing of any or all
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private parties, other than that of the charity or cofiduciaries, should
depend on what the attorney general has done or failed to do.  As
described in Part IV of this Article, the recent Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision rejecting standing for the Hershey alumni
association suggests that the law is not liberalizing along these lines,
but a nuanced approach might be necessary.281
C. DONOR’S ROLE IN CY PRES PROCEEDING AND EFFECTS OF THE
PASSAGE OF TIME
Section 450 is entitled “Role of the Donor in a Modification
Proceeding; Effects of Passage of Time.”  The draft black letter
provides that in a judicial proceeding under Section 440 (Cy Pres
and Deviation)—
(a)  The relevant donor intent is that expressed in the
gift instrument, not at the time of modification.
(b)  If permitted by court rules, the donor may be a
proper party if standing under such circumstances is
provided in the gift instrument.
(c)  The policy of adhering to a gift restriction,
whether going to administration or charitable purpose,
and including any enforcement right of the donor or
other private party, diminishes with time and
unanticipated circumstances.
The draft attempts to give maximum flexibility to the charity,
while recognizing articulations of donor intent expressly agreed to
by the charity.  As to Subsection (a) of the black letter, draft
Comment a states:
Donor intent at the time of the restricted gift includes
any provisions in the gift instrument addressing the
possibility that unanticipated circumstances would
require modification.  Where it is not clear what the
donor would have intended regarding the effect of
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282 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 450 cmt. a (Preliminary Draft No. 3,
2005).
283 Id. § 450 cmt. b.
284 See Smithers v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426, 436 (App. Div. 2001)
(Friedman, J., dissenting).  The dissent explained:
As the majority aptly notes, the relationship between Mr. Smithers and the
hospital was at times strained.  Yet, like the loving parent of an errant
child, Mr. Smithers resolved his disputes with the hospital and kept
contributing over the course of a relationship spanning 23 years,
notwithstanding the hospital’s failure to honor some of his wishes and its
use of funds for other than anticipated purposes.
Id.  See also Amarillo Area Found. v. Metro. Opera Ass’n, Cause No. 91214-A (Potter County,
Texas, July 22, 2003) (on file with author).  In Paragraph 42 of the opinion, the court notes:
Throughout the more than twenty (20) years of its relationship with Mrs.
Harrington, the Trust and the Foundation, the Met has consistently failed
to abide by the terms of Mrs. Harrington’s bequest.  Its persistent and
willful violation of the terms of the bequest necessitate the appointment
of a trustee to oversee and control the Met’s expenditure of the moneys
contained in the Harrington Fund and to ensure the Met’s compliance with
the terms of the 1987 and 1988 Agreements.
Id.  See Winter & Cheng, supra note 133; supra notes 159–70 and accompanying text.
285 See supra notes 64–75 and accompanying text.
unanticipated circumstances on the gift restriction, or if
the gift instrument is silent, it would ordinarily be fair to
infer that the donor intends to defer to the charity in
offering a reasonable proposal to modify to the
restriction.282
Draft Comment b observes that it is not uncommon for a major
inter vivos gift to be followed by continuing communication between
donor and charity.283  During the post-gift course of dealings, the
donor might object to how the charity is carrying out the obligations,
as perceived by the donor, set forth in the gift instrument.  But if the
donor acquiesces in the charity’s conduct—especially by providing
additional financial or other support to the charity, including service
on the governing board—then the donor’s intent should be
interpreted in light of this waiver.284
As to standing, draft Comment e to Section 750 rejects extending
the approach adopted in the Uniform Trust Code that permits a
trust settlor to bring suit to modify a charitable trust.285  However,
subsection (b) of draft Section 450 recognizes donor standing to
commence or otherwise participate in such a cy pres proceeding if
provided in the gift instrument.  The general policy for allowing a
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286 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 450 cmt. c (Preliminary Draft No. 3,
2005).
287 See supra notes 91–113 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 181–92 and accompanying text (discussing implementation versus
breach versus cy pres).
289 Harvey J. Goldschmid, as discussant on this Article at the NCPL Conference, supra
note *, suggested that the term “attorney general” should also include a person (including the
donor) granted relator status by the attorney general.
290 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 450(c) cmt. d(2) (Preliminary Draft No. 3,
2005).
291 Id. § 450(c).
292 Id. cmt. d(1).
donor standing to participate in a cy pres proceeding seems weaker
than to enforce the gift, because by definition if cy pres relief is
necessary a new purpose will have to be chosen.286  Nevertheless, the
new UPMIFA project provides an expanded role for donors, so in a
state whose legislature adopts UPMIFA, the charity will be able to
release or modify a restriction with the donor’s consent.287  In a non-
UPMIFA state, where resort to court would be required for cy pres
relief, it might therefore be appropriate for a charity to agree that
the donor could participate in the proceeding even when the Uniform
Trust Code does not apply.  This raises a difficult issue, however:  If
the charity itself does not believe that a cy pres proceeding is
necessary—that is, if the charity thinks that its use of the gift comes
within its discretion to implement the restriction—can the donor
challenge that threshold finding in court?288  (See the discussion of
implementation versus breach versus cy pres in Part III.C, above.)
Subsection (c) of draft Section 450 provides that the passage of
time affects any rights of enforcement provided by agreement.  Draft
Comment d(2) emphasizes that the restriction remains legally
binding on the charity, and so the policy of limiting the standing of
private parties has no effect on enforcement by the attorney
general289 or by co-trustees or directors.290  The passage of time also
affects the merits of a modification proceeding.  Subsection (c) takes
the position that the more time has passed from the date of the gift,
the more flexible should be the court’s threshold of willingness to
grant relief and the type of relief granted.291  Draft Comment d(1)
states that the requisite amount of time is a matter for the court to
determine under the circumstances.292  A variety of reformers have
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293 See generally Brody, supra note 1 (noting reformers have suggested various time limits
including specific time periods, lives in being plus twenty-one years, and one generation of
trust administrator).





described the policy behind a range of time limits.293  The draft
Comment identifies several complicating factors.  First, a particular
gift (or fund) may have multiple donors with possibly different
intentions.294  Second, the restricted gift may be one of many to the
institution, and the burden of compliance increases over time and as
gifts multiply.295  Third, a corporate charity, in contrast to a
charitable trust, might be engaged in a range of complex operations,
and its board must make business decisions regarding a variety of
revenue and expense categories.296  Tying the use of restricted
donations too closely to the original purpose can unduly hamper the
responsible management of charitable programs.
That draft Comment explains that there is no explicit common
law precedent for subsection (c).297  However, the Comment explains
that relaxing a restriction after the passage of time can be justified
on the following four policy grounds:
i. The more time that passes, the more likely will the
donor’s scheme lose its relevance.  This is
particularly true for administrative and secondary
restrictions, which can grow increasingly
idiosyncratic and ineffectual, and less socially
worthwhile.
ii. The more time that passes, the more likely will
public benefits arise that the donor could not have
anticipated.
iii. In economic terms, if donor intent is honored for a
long time, the donor will have “recovered” most if
not all of the present value of the restriction, and
thus decisions to make gifts will not be discouraged.
iv. The more time that passes, the more likely will an
individual donor of an inter vivos gift have died, and
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298 Id. at 332–33.
299 Eason, supra note 135 (footnote omitted).  After noting judicial precedent for alternative
ways to accommodate a donor’s name perpetuation desires—such as “applying the name to an
alternate facility serving the same or a related charitable class or purpose, or, similarly,
creating a named fund to serve those ends”—Eason comments:
In the case of Avery Fisher Hall, for example, can anyone truly say that
after thirty years of recognition, Mr. Fisher would (or should) not be
satisfied with an ongoing prominent display of his name and the history of
his contribution in the lobby of a substantially renovated and renamed
concert hall, perhaps amplified by special annual performances specifically
commemorating his contribution?  In fact, an annual performance to
commemorate Mr. Fisher’s gift could easily recur into perpetuity and
would actually embody the very essence of his obvious charitable desires.
Moreover, such a tribute would arguably call attention to his interests and
efforts in a manner comparable, if not superior, to that occasioned by
letters etched in cold granite above a slowly deteriorating doorway.
Ultimately, long-delayed but carefully tailored deviations from the
particulars of a past naming contribution do not deprive donors of
substantial returns on their contribution “bargains.”
these Principles do not accord rights to monitor and
enforce a restriction to the donor’s successors in
interest or other related parties, unless specified in
the gift instrument.  For institutional donors, while
the entity has perpetual life, the individuals who
govern the entity do change over time.298
Indeed, an attorney general might similarly find that, with the
passage of time, public policy for enforcing the restriction has
weakened, and thus decide not to bring suit.
Compare the observations by Professor John Eason regarding the
claim asserted by Avery Fisher’s family:
[E]ven if specific performance is an available remedy, the
request would require that Avery Fisher’s name adorn
any substantially renovated or even new concert hall
that ever graces the Lincoln Center campus.  The
pro-donor perspective would no doubt embrace the
argument that it is sufficient that the contribution did
some immediate and future (though limited in duration)
good and was accepted.  From the standpoint of society’s
stake in this venture, however, such an outcome
concedes too much to Mr. Fisher.299
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300 Id. at 454 (footnote omitted). 
Eason concludes with the normative question:
[I]f Mr. Fisher would not, today, accept any compromise
regarding the display of his name, the real question that
society should ask is whether charities should ever be
permitted to give so much away in the first instance,
when the lure of immediate dollars may readily threaten
to overwhelm thoughtful concern for the future
implementation and accomplishment of that charity’s
public mission.300
Note, moreover, that the Avery Fisher gift was actually made by the
family foundation, an institutional donor with no natural life.
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301 Compare the opposite approaches taken in 2005 by appellate courts in Indiana and
Tennessee.  In St. Mary’s Medical Center, Inc. v. McCarthy, 829 N.E.2d 1068, 1077 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005), the court (while not addressing standing) found “there are Indiana cases
suggesting that St. Mary’s use of the chapel for nearly fifty years constituted substantial
compliance with any charitable trust or condition subsequent imposed by Haney’s will.”  In St.
Mary’s the will did not specify the form that the memorial would have to take or how long it
was to last.  The court “note[d] that although charitable gifts should be encouraged so far as
possible, charities themselves should not be bound to one particular use of bequeathed
property for multiple generations unless they are on clear notice that such is a requirement
of the bequest.”  Id. at 1076–77 (footnote omitted).  In footnote 4, the court commented:
There was evidence presented here that the Chapel of Mary, Queen could
stand for another fifty to seventy-five years, if not longer.  McCarthy
essentially asserts that St. Mary’s must allow the chapel to stand for at
least that long; the wording of the trial court’s order also would seem to
require St. Mary’s to do nothing that might hasten the chapel’s demise and
that it would have to wait until the chapel crumbled of its own accord
before it could put the property on which it stands to another use.  We
decline to so hold in the absence of clear evidence that St. Mary’s knew it
was irrevocably tying up a substantial piece of its grounds for at least 100
to 125 years when it agreed to use the funds from Haney’s estate to build
the chapel.
Id. at 1077 n.4.  But compare the contracts approach in Tennessee Division of the United
Daughters of the Confederacy v. Vanderbilt University, 174 S.W.3d 98, 118 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2005), where the court held that the donee could not now, after seventy years of performance,
repudiate a now-unwanted name on a dormitory while the building still stood:
Vanderbilt’s argument that it should be excused from complying with the
inscription condition contained in the 1933 contract because the Tennessee
U.D.C. has already received enough value for its original contribution to
the construction of the building is likewise without merit.  The courts must
interpret contracts as they are written.
Id.  The court did not impose a perpetuity, however:
Given the nature of the project and the content of the conditions, we
conclude that these conditions were not meant to bind Peabody College
forever but instead were to be limited to the life of the building itself.
Thus, as long as the building stands, these . . . conditions apply to the gift.
Id. at 117.  The court declared that “allowing Vanderbilt and other academic institutions to
jettison their contractual and other legal obligations so casually would seriously impair their
ability to raise money in the future by entering into gift agreements such as the ones at issue
here.”  Id. at 118–19.
302 Id. at 119 (“[I]f Vanderbilt continues to elect not to comply with the terms of the gift,
it must pay the Tennessee U.D.C. in today’s dollars the value of the original gift in 1933.”).
The court explicitly rejected the alternative approach that would require Vanderbilt to pay
interest: 
Any requirement that Vanderbilt pay interest on the original donation
would necessarily be premised on the idea that the Tennessee U.D.C. was
Finally, the passage of time can affect the remedy.301  Where
restitution is appropriate, at least one court has ruled that the
amount must be increased to reflect the change in the value of a
dollar from the time the gift was made.302
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deprived of all beneficial use of the funds from the time of the original
donation to the present.  Such an approach would invite an offset defense
by Vanderbilt and would require the trial court to attempt to quantify the
value to the Tennessee U.D.C. not only of the housing awards [students
designated by the plaintiff lived in the dormitory], but also of having the
inscription on the pediment of the building for the past seventy years.
Determining the value of an inscription is not a matter that is subject to
easy proof or to reasonably definite calculation, and any attempt to do so
would lead to a calculation of damages that was impermissibly speculative
in nature.
Id. at 119.  The court cited to Prentis Family Foundation v. Barbara Ann Karmanos Cancer
Institute, 698 N.W.2d 900, 906 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), which found that there was no method
to measure damages for the loss of naming rights.  Id.  See discussion of Prentis, supra notes
140–45.
D. PROPOSED APPLICATION OF LEGAL REGIME TO PARADIGMATIC CASES
Returning to the four cases set forth at the beginning of this
Article, the draft ALI provisions just summarized would result in the
following consequences:
CASE 1: D gives $100,000 to C University to establish a
fund to support library operations.  D has no
standing to sue to recover the gift, to enforce the
restriction, or to commence a cy pres proceeding.
CASE 2: D gives $100,000 to C University to establish a
fund to support library operations.  C agrees
that D may bring suit to specifically enforce the
restricted gift.  D may not sue to recover the gift
or to commence a cy pres proceeding.  D may
sue, however, to enforce the restriction (this
amount being material) within a period of time
supported by public policy.  A court will
construe the restriction with greater flexibility
as more time passes.
CASE 3: D gives $100,000 to C University to establish a
fund to support library operations.  C agrees
that D and D’s descendants may bring suit to
specifically enforce the restricted gift.  The
results are the same as in CASE 2 except that
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the time limit for private enforcement also
applies to D’s descendants.
CASE 4: D gives $100,000 to C University to establish a
fund to support library operations, but that if C
University does not carry out the purposes of
the gift, the gift shifts to H University.  The
results are the same as in CASE 2 except that
H’s rights trump in a cy pres (but not a
deviation) proceeding.  Presumably, H’s rights
to bring a direct action for the gift over do not
terminate within any period of time.
These results may change in subsequent drafts.  For example, the
ALI project might propose that if in CASE 1 the attorney general had
a disabling conflict of interest and therefore refused to bring suit to
enforce the restriction, a court could find that D (and any other
appropriate private party) has a special interest.  Additional
commentary might usefully distinguish between charges of
mismanagement and disagreement over implementation, with
agreed-to donor standing limited to the former case.
VI.  CONCLUSION
The courts’ increased and continued confusion over what law to
apply to private enforcement of charitable gifts suggests that the
existing legal classifications are not working.  Charitable trust law
does not by its terms apply to restricted gifts not made in trust.  To
allow the donor to obtain enforcement rights by agreement—and to
spell out what could be quite detailed and long-lived powers for the
donor and others—fails to take into account the public policy limits
on private ordering that should apply to charitable assets.  A better
solution might be to acknowledge the unique character of these
“giftracts” and to craft a tailored legal regime for them.  Such a
regime would address not only standing but also consider imposing
such conditions as notification of the attorney general, time limits on
private (but not attorney general) enforcement, and a
circumscription of appropriate remedies in order to protect the
charity.  I have undertaken such a project as part of the larger topic
2007] CHARITABLE-DONOR STANDING 1275
303 Moreover, steering disputes such as these to Alternative Dispute Resolution appears
promising, a route I have only begun to explore in my project for the ALI.
304 Courts v. Annie Penn Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 431 S.E.2d 864, 867 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).  Note
that the court ruled on the merits of whether the gift was restricted and did not address
standing.  Id.  Compare the concluding sentence in the Herzog Foundation dissent, quoted in
Part II.C.1 of this Article.
of enforcement (both public and private) of charitable duties in my
work as Reporter for the American Law Institute’s Principles of the
Law of Nonprofit Organizations.303  Several of the issues, however,
will likely require a legislative solution.
One final word:  Many of these cases could have been avoided by
more sensible and sensitive behavior by the charity.  Mrs. Smithers
(discussed in Part II.B.2) learned of St. Luke’s plans when at the last
minute it cancelled a gala that she had been working on for a year.
Princeton University and the Robertson family do not really seem to
have substantive differences (see discussion in Part III.A).  Countless
additional situations fly below the radar screen.  One appellate
court, while ruling against the donor, recently distinguished between
legally mandated and appropriate behavior:
The record illustrates that the Hospital, in accepting Ms.
Courts’ generous gift, failed to take great care to see that
it was adequately recognized in a manner acceptable to
the generous don[or], and failed to ensure that there
were no misunderstandings regarding how it intended to
utilize the gift.  Essentially, it appears that the Hospital
and its administration, though initially openly
appreciative of the gift, became insensitive to the fact
that the elderly Ms. Courts had unselfishly donated her
life’s savings to the Hospital.  We do not wish to condone
such callousness, as it will act only to discourage the
generosity of private citizens necessary to serve the
public good.304
Failure to abide by internal processes for honoring donor
restrictions can bedevil the best of institutions:  Recently, the
Metropolitan Museum of Art reportedly withdrew a piece of
sculpture it planned to auction “after realizing that it had violated
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305 Michael Kimmelman, Met Yields to Donor, Canceling Sculpture Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 2006, at B7.
306 Id.
307 Comments of Stephen Schwarz at NCPL conference discussed supra note *.
308 Enid Nemy, Enid A. Haupt, Philanthropist, Dies at 99, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2005, at
B13.
309 See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, The Charity in Bankruptcy and the Ghosts of Donors Past,
Present, and Future, 29 SETON HALL LEG. J. 471 (2005) (discussing, in a symposium issue on
bankruptcy in the religious nonprofit context, how donors concerned about use of Catholic
church’s funds might design their giving).  See also Siegel, supra note 5.
its own de-accessioning policy.  Met guidelines call for the museum
to consult the donor of an object or his estate if it decides to sell it
within 25 years after the gift was made.”305  According to this news
report, the donor (who made the gift in 1986) “contacted The New
York Times . . . to complain that the Met had never informed him of
the planned sale and that he had learned of it only after a friend
pointed it out to him at Sotheby’s Web site.”306  In general, Professor
Stephen Schwarz recommends that charities make regular reports
to donors on compliance with gifts, explain how fees are assessed
against restricted funds, and consult with donors should
circumstances change.307
The New York Times obituary of philanthropist Enid Haupt
observed:  “She was once asked how often the projects she supported
ended up as she had visualized them.  ‘When they think I’ll see it,’
she said.”308  Not all charity benefactors can live long enough to
fulfill their specific goals.  But even while they live, to the extent
donors are unable to enforce their desires in court—or even perceive
that they cannot—what form will philanthropy take in the future?
That question lies tantalizingly beyond the scope of this Article.309
